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How Market Makers Get Paid: Your Free Trade Is Bought by the Firm on the Other Side, and Options Carry Most of the Bill

· 21 min read How Market Makers Get Paid: Your Free Trade Is Bought by the Firm on the Other Side, and Options Carry Most of the Bill

Forty-second in a series on jobs whose pay system is stranger than the salary. Its companion, how the Depository Trust Company is paid, follows your shares to where they sit; this one follows your order to where it is filled, and to the firm that pays your broker for it. It sits with the other tolls on money in motion, from the mortgage bond seller to the financial planner. Every figure is cited to a broker's Rule 606 routing report, an SEC filing, an SEC or FINRA document, a foreign regulator, or the federal wage survey, and sums or ratios I computed are labeled "my arithmetic."

When a broker charges you no commission, someone is still paying. In the third quarter of 2026, Robinhood Securities reported $543.2 million in net payments from the venues that filled its customers' orders (my arithmetic, summing its own report). Of that, $413.8 million came from options orders. The single largest payer, Citadel Securities, paid $188.35 million for Robinhood's options orders alone in those three months.

That money is called payment for order flow. The firms that pay it are market makers, also called wholesalers: trading companies that stand ready to buy when you sell and sell when you buy. Your broker is paid for sending you to them. The market maker earns a realized spread: what is left of the quoted spread after any price improvement it gives you and after its losses to better-informed traders. That is two tolls on one order, and most customers see neither.

What the broker is selling, in the regulator's words

The SEC's investor guide to trade execution describes it plainly. Exchanges or market makers may pay a broker "perhaps a penny or more per share" for routing an order to them, and the SEC calls this "payment for order flow."

The SEC staff's October 2021 report on the GameStop trading episode explains why a trading firm would pay for your order. Off-exchange market makers "typically offer payment to the retail broker-dealer for the right to trade with its customer order flow." Retail orders are worth paying for because they are "less correlated with future prices," small, and "one and done." In plain terms, a retail order is unlikely to come from someone who knows where the price is going next, so filling it is safer than filling an order from a professional.

The same report names the problem. These payments "can create a conflict of interest." They are negotiated privately, the rates "can vary substantially," and the market maker may let the broker decide how much of the value goes to the customer as price improvement and how much the broker keeps.

Robinhood's own filing adds a detail. In its 10-Q for the third quarter of 2026, Robinhood says it is paid for routing equity, option and crypto orders to "market makers, wholesalers and other liquidity providers," and that the arrangements "are often not documented under binding contracts." Exchanges pay rebates too, the GameStop report notes, but exchange pricing must be filed and posted; wholesaler payments are private deals.

Toll one: the payment for your order

The best public view of this money is the Rule 606 report. Under 17 CFR 242.606, every broker must post a quarterly report, broken down by month, of where it routed customers' non-directed held orders. It must list the top 10 venues and any venue that got 5 percent or more of orders, give separate sections for S&P 500 stocks, other stocks and options, and show the net payment for order flow from each venue, in total dollars and per share. It must also describe the "material aspects" of each venue relationship.

Here is what the third-quarter 2026 reports show. Each figure is my sum of the three months and all four order types across every listed venue. Exchange rebates and fees are netted in.

Scroll to compare columns and rows when the table extends beyond the box.

Broker (606 filer) Equities Options Options share of total
Robinhood Securities $129,478,082 $413,763,127 76.2%
Charles Schwab $157,802,505 $348,357,373 68.8%
Webull Financial $28,060,281 $86,168,843 75.4%
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney (payments from the E*TRADE channel only) $27,768,577 $57,588,154 67.5%
Fidelity Brokerage Services $23,633,863 $75,911,574 76.3%
Interactive Brokers (mostly exchange rebates) $16,898,183 $31,692,362 65.2%

Robinhood files a second report for Robinhood Financial, which I left out of the table on purpose. Robinhood Securities says it "passes 80% of such revenue to RHF," so the Robinhood Financial report is the same money counted again. Do not add the two.

Who pays the most? In Robinhood Securities' options section, Citadel Securities paid $188.35 million, Dash/IMC $131.05 million, Jane Street $41.82 million, Global Execution Brokers $34.24 million and Wolverine $18.29 million. In Schwab's options section, Citadel paid $110.64 million, Dash/IMC $85.98 million, Jane Street $78.14 million and Global Execution Brokers $56.15 million. For Schwab's non-S&P 500 stocks, the top payers were Citadel at $55.47 million, Hudson River Trading at $29.10 million and Virtu at $27.48 million.

The reports also give a rate. For market orders in September 2026, here is the net payment per 100 shares from Citadel Securities, in cents:

Scroll to compare columns and rows when the table extends beyond the box.

Broker S&P 500 stocks Other stocks Options (per contract)
Robinhood Securities 91.5 (Virtu paid 143.8) 17.5 37.1
Schwab 14.9 11.9 62.8
Webull 108.2 11.3 32.3
Morgan Stanley Smith Barney 18.9 17.9 39.6
Fidelity 6.4 5.6 28.6

The "material aspects" text spells out the deals:

  • Robinhood Securities: for stocks, 12.35 percent of the quoted spread in regular hours, 9 percent in extended hours, and $0.0006 per share overnight. For options, $0.30 to $1.20 per contract for orders of 1 to 100 contracts depending on the symbol's average spread, half that for larger orders, and nothing on index options.
  • Schwab: for stocks, "$0.0015 per share or less" on marketable orders and "$0.0036 per share or less" on non-marketable ones. For options, "$1.12 per contract or less" on marketable orders, with all market makers paying the same rate.
  • Webull: 13 percent of the quoted spread on market and marketable limit orders, and $0.23 to $1.00 per contract on options.
  • Fidelity: "$0.0008 per share or less" on marketable stock orders; $0.30 to $0.40 per contract on single-leg marketable options.
  • Morgan Stanley Smith Barney: payments come only from its self-directed E*TRADE channel. On full-service orders it "does not seek or receive payment for order flow."
  • Interactive Brokers: IBKR Lite orders go to over-the-counter market makers, each of which pays "a rebate of 12% of the spread" on marketable orders. IBKR Pro figures are exchange rebates and fees.

Options carry most of the bill

Look at the last column of the first table. At every broker checked, options were 65 to 76 percent of the payments. The filings agree: Robinhood's 2025 options revenue was about 3.7 times its stock revenue (my arithmetic), and Schwab's options order flow revenue beat its equities order flow revenue in every period in the table below.

The pricing explains it. Stock payments are set per share or as a slice of the spread. Options payments are set per contract and tiered by how wide the symbol's spread is. At Schwab's stated caps, 100 shares of stock bring the broker at most 15 cents, while one options contract, which covers 100 shares, brings up to $1.12. That is about 7.5 times as much for the same 100 shares (my arithmetic).

The venues differ too. Fidelity's report says "All options trades must occur on an exchange and are subject to exchange pricing schedules." The GameStop report says payment for order flow "is prevalent in the options market, potentially more so than in the equities market, but order flow that is purchased by consolidators is executed on exchange." That is why the options payers include consolidators such as Dash/IMC, Global Execution Brokers and Wolverine alongside Citadel Securities and Jane Street.

Fidelity changed sides in 2026

Fidelity's own routing reports show it began taking payment for stock orders this year. Its report for the first quarter of 2026 said it, through its clearing firm National Financial Services, "does not receive payment for order flow ... related to any order flow routed to wholesale market-makers, including marketable equity orders," and it showed nothing from Citadel for January through March. The second-quarter report says it "receives payment for order flow (PFOF) for orders that are executed by this wholesale market-maker." Citadel's payments for S&P 500 stock orders were $186,105 in April, $333,933 in May and $391,134 in June 2026. The third-quarter report keeps the same language. Its stock payments for the quarter add up to $23.6 million including exchange rebates, such as about $2.88 million from Cboe EDGX and $2.81 million from Nasdaq; the six wholesale market makers it lists paid about $17.8 million of it, led by Citadel at about $5.96 million (my arithmetic). I found no Fidelity announcement explaining the change.

What the brokers book

The 606 reports show what each market maker paid. The brokers' SEC filings show what it is worth to the broker.

Robinhood. Transaction-based revenue was $2.628 billion in 2025, 59 percent of total net revenues of $4.473 billion. Options were $1.123 billion of it, crypto $901 million and stocks $302 million. In the third quarter of 2026, transaction-based revenue was $867 million, 61 percent of the total. Robinhood says 2025 options revenue rose on "higher option rebate rates due to the mix of ticker symbols traded," partly offset by "a $55 million increase of match incentives paid to our customers." The third-quarter 2026 rise came from a 66 percent increase in contracts traded per trader, partly offset by lower rebate rates and an 11 percent drop in the number of people trading options.

The concentration is the striking part. Citadel Securities alone was 13 percent of Robinhood's total net revenues in 2025, about $581 million (my arithmetic), and 17 percent in the third quarter of 2026, about $242 million (my arithmetic).

Charles Schwab. Schwab defines order flow revenue as "payments received from trade execution venues to which our broker-dealer subsidiary sends equity and option orders."

Scroll to compare columns and rows when the table extends beyond the box.

Schwab ($ millions) 2023 2024 2025 Q3 2026
Order flow: options 949 1,010 1,167 446
Order flow: equities 455 467 763 192
Total order flow revenue 1,404 1,477 1,930 638
Commissions 1,601 1,591 1,797 463

In 2025, Schwab earned $133 million more from order flow than from commissions (my arithmetic). Its 10-Q attributes the third-quarter 2026 rise to "higher rates."

The two sources do not match, and they are not supposed to. Schwab's 606 sums for the third quarter come to $506.2 million (my arithmetic); its 10-Q says $638 million. Robinhood Securities' 606 sums come to $543.2 million; its 10-Q reports $520 million of options plus stock revenue. A 606 report covers only held, non-directed orders at the listed venues, and neither company publishes a reconciliation.

I did not find a separate order flow revenue line for Morgan Stanley's E*TRADE channel or for Webull, and Fidelity is privately held, so it files no 10-K.

Toll two: the spread the market maker keeps

The market maker pays the broker and can still make money, because it earns a realized spread: what is left of the quoted spread after the price improvement it gives you and after the losses it takes trading against better-informed traders. Only one large wholesaler shows its full books in public.

Virtu Financial files with the SEC. Its figures are for the whole company, which by its own description trades on hundreds of venues in over 50 countries and in multiple asset classes, and they include its Execution Services segment, not only market making. In thousands of dollars:

Scroll to compare columns and rows when the table extends beyond the box.

Virtu ($ thousands) FY2023 FY2024 FY2025 9M 2026
Trading income, net 1,301,344 1,822,437 2,436,707 2,466,035
Total revenue 2,293,373 2,876,949 3,632,118 3,439,220
Brokerage, exchange, clearance fees and payments for order flow, net 508,358 674,426 769,774 639,877
Net income 263,921 534,535 912,264 914,067

Virtu's net income for the first nine months of 2026 already exceeds its net income for all of 2025 (my arithmetic). Its 2025 net income was about 25 percent of revenue, against DTC's 15.6 percent covered in the companion piece (my arithmetic). Its market making segment paid $650.2 million of the $769.8 million fee and order flow line.

But Virtu does not break out what it pays for order flow. It defines the payments as going "to broker-dealer clients, in the normal course of business, for directing their order flow in U.S. equities to the Company," and lumps them with exchange and clearing fees, netted against exchange rebates. The only public view of how much each wholesaler pays each broker is the brokers' 606 reports.

Citadel Securities is private. Its annual SEC filing, Form X-17A-5, is a statement of financial condition only, with no income statement or order flow totals. Revenue figures for it that circulate, including ones quoted in an earlier post here on quant desks, come from press reports, not filings. What the filings do show is Citadel Securities' weight from the other side: 13 percent of Robinhood's revenue, and the top payer in most of the 606 sections above. It is DTC participant 8430.

Jane Street, Hudson River Trading, Susquehanna's G1, IMC and Wolverine are also private, with no public income statements. Their payments appear only in brokers' 606 reports.

Did customers come out ahead? Rule 605 and best execution

The case for payment for order flow is that customers get better prices than the quote, and no commission. The record from the regulators is mixed.

The 2020 enforcement case. In a settled order announced December 17, 2020, the SEC found that Robinhood Financial made misleading statements about payment for order flow, its largest revenue source, between 2015 and late 2018. "Due in large part to its unusually high payment for order flow rates," the SEC said, Robinhood customers got prices "inferior to other brokers' prices," which in aggregate "deprived customers of $34.1 million even after taking into account the savings from not paying a commission." Robinhood paid a $65 million penalty.

The split. The GameStop report found that Robinhood took "approximately a 20/80 split of the value between price improvement and payment for order flow," which was "substantially higher" than the "typical 80/20 rate the principal trading firms paid to other retail broker-dealers." It also warned that because the quoted best price leaves out odd lots and hidden orders, "price improvement statistics based on the NBBO may overstate the actual price improvement."

The shortfall estimate. When the SEC proposed its Order Competition Rule in December 2022, it found that brokers send "more than 90%" of individual investors' marketable orders to wholesalers, and that wholesalers internalize 90.44 percent of the dollar volume they receive. It estimated a "competitive shortfall" of about "1.08 cents for every $100 traded," or $1.5 billion a year based on early 2022 data. On a $10,000 trade that is about $1.08 (my arithmetic). The proposal would have required many of those orders to go through an auction first, and the SEC estimated savings to individual investors of $1.12 billion to $2.35 billion a year.

The withdrawal. In June 2025 the SEC withdrew that proposal and its proposed Regulation Best Execution, along with 12 others. The notice says the Commission "does not intend to issue final rules" and would issue a new proposal if it acts again. So there is no SEC best execution rule. The duty rests on FINRA Rule 5310, which, as the SEC quotes it, requires a firm to "use reasonable diligence to ascertain the best market for the subject security and buy or sell in such market so that the resultant price to the customer is as favorable as possible under prevailing market conditions." A footnote in the GameStop report quotes FINRA Regulatory Notice 21-23 (June 2021) on the same point: "firms that provide payment for order flow for the opportunity to internalize customer orders cannot allow such payments to interfere with their best execution obligations."

The new Rule 605 data. In March 2024 the SEC amended Rule 605, the monthly execution quality report. It now covers large brokers with at least 100,000 customers, not just market centers, measures time in milliseconds or finer, and requires every reporting firm to publish a summary report. Compliance began August 1, 2026. Robinhood's October 2026 summary, for market orders under $200,000:

Scroll to compare columns and rows when the table extends beyond the box.

Measure S&P 500 stocks Other stocks
Executed at the quote or better 96.28% 87.82%
Executed with price improvement 84.64% 62.36%
Average effective spread 0.0174% 0.0766%
Average quoted spread 0.0579% 0.1436%
Effective spread as share of quoted 30.07% 53.38%

That is one broker's month, from its own report. I did not compile the same table across brokers, so it is not a ranking.

Europe banned it; UK regulators have opposed it since 2012

The European Union. Regulation (EU) 2024/791 added Article 39a to MiFIR, "Prohibition of receiving payment for order flow." Investment firms acting for retail clients, and for professional clients who opted in, may not be paid for routing their orders to a particular venue. A member state whose firms took payment before March 28, 2024 could exempt them until June 30, 2026, so the ban applies across the EU from July 1, 2026.

The United Kingdom. The FSA, the FCA's predecessor, said in its May 2012 guidance that the practice creates "a clear conflict of interest" and "is unlikely to be compatible with our inducements rule." The FCA's 2019 review says it later "explained that PFOF in relation to retail and professional client business is incompatible with our rules on conflicts of interest and inducements," and that the payments are "likely to affect aggregate spreads," calling them "hidden costs." Its March 2026 priorities plan to "Review our position on payment for order flow in 2026."

Canada. A 2023 staff notice from Canada's securities regulators says "UMIR 7.5 has the effect of prohibiting PFOF by a dealer."

What a retail investor can check

The 606 and 605 reports above are public. Three more checks are yours to make. Under Rule 606(b)(1), a broker must tell you on request where your orders went in the prior six months, and the SEC suggests asking about policies on "payment for order flow, internalization, or other routing practices." The SEC defines a limit order as "an order to buy or sell a stock at a specific price," so it caps what you pay, and a market order does not. And customers "may be able to" direct an order to a particular venue, the SEC says, though some brokers charge for it. Most brokers' 606 reports are mirrored on FINRA's 606 data page.

What the wage survey shows

The Bureau of Labor Statistics has no occupation for market-making traders. They fall under code 41-3031, Securities, Commodities, and Financial Services Sales Agents, or other codes. In May 2025, 41-3031 had 489,570 jobs. The median wage was $78,660 and the mean was $109,150, or $52.48 an hour. The 10th percentile was $48,040, the 25th $56,540, the 75th $129,950 and the 90th $212,880. This updates the May 2023 figures used in the mortgage bond sellers piece, when the median was $76,900.

The mean sits about $30,490 above the median (my arithmetic), the same bonus-shaped gap that piece described. Of the jobs, 257,110 were in credit intermediation and 173,040 in securities, commodity contracts and other financial investments. The New York metro area alone had 59,450. The survey's top reported figure is the 90th percentile, so it says nothing about pay at the very top of the field, where the best-paid traders at the wholesalers above sit.

For scale on the employer side, Virtu reported about 1,027 full-time employees as of February 13, 2026, 69 percent in the Americas, against 2025 revenue of $3.63 billion.

How an ordinary person gets into this business

There are two paths: work at a trading firm, or start one. Both run through FINRA's exams and the SEC's capital rule.

The exams. The Securities Industry Essentials exam is "open to anyone aged 18 or older," and "Association with a firm is not required." The trader's exam is the Series 57, the Securities Trader exam, which covers Nasdaq equity trading, OTC equity trading and proprietary trading and, unlike the SIE, requires that candidates be "associated with and sponsored by a FINRA member firm." The Series 7 and the adviser exams are covered in the financial planners piece. So the realistic first step for one person is the SIE, then a job at a firm that will sponsor the Series 57.

Starting a trading firm. Rule 15c3-1 sorts registered broker-dealers into net capital categories, and one that "effects more than ten transactions in any one calendar year for its own investment account" falls in the dealer category, with a $100,000 minimum. A market maker must also keep "not less than $2,500 for each security in which it makes a market," or $1,000 for each security priced at $5 or less, based on the 30-day average number of markets it makes. That requirement never falls below the dealer minimum and never rises above $1,000,000 for this purpose. Making markets in 200 stocks priced above $5, for example, would mean $500,000 (my arithmetic).

Exchange market makers also carry quoting duties: a 2010 SEC order required them to "maintain continuous two-sided quotations throughout the trading day" within set bands around the best quote, which were later adjusted, and I did not read the current exchange rule text. At scale, a market maker settles through DTC directly; DTC's participant list includes Citadel Securities (8430), Virtu Americas (0295), Jane Street Capital (8497) and Wolverine Execution Services (7350), and the companion piece covers what joining takes.

What a salaried reader should take from this

Free has a payer, and the payer is on the other side of your trade. A commission-free trade may be paid for by a trading firm that buys your order and profits from what is left of the spread. That is not a scandal by itself, but it is a price you did not see.

The money is in options. At every broker checked, options were about two-thirds to three-quarters of the payments, because one contract can pay the broker several times what 100 shares do. If a broker's app makes options easy, its 606 report shows why.

The disclosure exists, but in pieces. The 606 report shows what each market maker paid, the 10-K what the broker booked, and nobody publishes the bridge. Apart from Virtu, the market makers publish almost nothing.

Rules differ by country, and the U.S. chose disclosure. The EU banned the practice from July 2026, and UK regulators treat it as incompatible with their rules. The SEC proposed an auction requirement and withdrew it, so in the U.S. what protects you is a best execution duty, the 605 and 606 reports, and your choice of order type.

Related reading

Fact-check notes and sources

Sums across months, order types and venues, and every ratio marked "my arithmetic," are mine.

  • The SEC's definition of payment for order flow, the 606(b) six-month request, limit orders and directed orders are from the SEC's investor publication Trade Execution: What Every Investor Should Know.
  • The SEC staff GameStop report (October 14, 2021), source of the conflict, negotiation, retail-flow, exchange rebate, 20/80 split, NBBO and options quotes and of the Regulatory Notice 21-23 quotation in its footnote 8, is Staff Report on Equity and Options Market Structure Conditions in Early 2021. The notice itself was not read, so its words are quoted as the report quotes them.
  • The Rule 606 requirements are 17 CFR 242.606.
  • The Q3 2026 Rule 606 reports: Robinhood Securities, Robinhood Financial, Charles Schwab, Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, Fidelity Brokerage Services, Webull Financial and Interactive Brokers. All dollar totals, venue totals and options shares are my sums of the reported monthly figures; the cents per 100 shares and payment terms are as reported for September 2026.
  • Fidelity's change is from its Q1 2026 and Q2 2026 606 reports and its Q3 report linked above. The Q3 split between exchanges and the six wholesale market makers is my arithmetic from the Q3 report's venue rows. No Fidelity announcement of the change was found, so its reason is not stated.
  • Robinhood revenue, Citadel concentration and the reasons for options revenue changes are from Robinhood's 10-K for 2025 and 10-Q for Q3 2026. The $581 million, $242 million and 3.7 times figures are my arithmetic.
  • Schwab order flow revenue and commissions are from Schwab's 10-K for 2025 and 10-Q for Q3 2026. The $133 million gap, the 7.5 times options comparison and the 606 totals compared with the filings are my arithmetic. No company reconciliation between 606 reports and filings was found.
  • Virtu's revenue, fee line, segment figures, its two operating segments, its own description of venues, countries and asset classes, payment definition and headcount are from Virtu's 10-K for 2025 and 10-Q for Q3 2026. The 25 percent margin and the nine-month comparison are my arithmetic.
  • Citadel Securities' filings are its Form X-17A-5 filings on SEC EDGAR, which contain a statement of financial condition only; no figures from that statement are used here. DTC participant numbers are from DTC's participant list as of September 30, 2026.
  • The Rule 605 amendments are SEC Release 34-99679; the August 1, 2026 compliance date is recited in SEC Release 34-105136 and confirmed in Robinhood's Q3 2026 10-Q. Robinhood's October 2026 summary is HOOD202610.csv.
  • The 2020 enforcement case is SEC press release 2020-321.
  • The Order Competition Rule findings are from SEC Release 34-96495, which also quotes FINRA Rule 5310 in its footnote 131; the Rule 5310 text here is taken from that quotation. The withdrawal is Federal Register document 2025-11110. The $1.08 example is my arithmetic.
  • The EU ban is Regulation (EU) 2024/791. Which member states used the exemption to June 30, 2026 was not verified, so none are named.
  • The UK position is from the FSA's May 2012 guidance, FG12/13, the FCA's 2019 Payment for Order Flow review and its wholesale markets priorities report.
  • The Canadian statement is from CSA Staff Notice 23-331. The UMIR 7.5 text itself was not read.
  • Wages for 41-3031 are from BLS OEWS, May 2025. The $30,490 gap is my arithmetic.
  • SIE and Series 57 facts are from FINRA's SIE and Series 57 pages.
  • The dealer net capital category, its $100,000 minimum and the market maker requirement are 17 CFR 240.15c3-1. The $500,000 example is my arithmetic. The 2010 quoting obligations are from the SEC's approval order, Federal Register document 2010-28443; current exchange rule text was not read.
  • Not asserted, and why: any academic study of price improvement (none collected); a cross-broker comparison of 605 summaries (not compiled); order flow revenue for E*TRADE and Webull (not pulled); Citadel Securities' revenue or order flow payments (not published in its filings); Fidelity's reason for the change (no announcement found); which EU member states used the exemption (not verified); Canadian treatment of U.S.-listed securities (not verified); SEC registration and FINRA membership application fees and timelines (read only in summary form); exact FINRA exam fees (conflicting figures).

This post is informational and journalistic, not legal, tax, financial, or investment advice, and nothing here is a recommendation to buy or sell any security, to use any order type, or to choose any broker. It describes broker routing reports, company filings, SEC and FINRA documents, foreign regulators' publications, and a federal wage survey. Payment rates, rules, and figures change every quarter, so verify current reports before relying on any of them. Mentions of specific companies and agencies are nominative fair use, and no affiliation is implied.

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