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Only Two Banks Have Opened in Idaho Since 2007. Here Is What Each Did With Its Charter

· 11 min read Only Two Banks Have Opened in Idaho Since 2007. Here Is What Each Did With Its Charter

The Solera post followed one bank in Colorado from its 2007 charter to a $1.55 billion institution controlled by one investor. Idaho offers a clean comparison, because Idaho's list is short. Searching the FDIC's records every way they allow, only two insured banks have opened in Idaho since the start of 2007, and none since March 31, 2008 (FDIC BankFind). The state's own annual reports agree: the Idaho Department of Finance issued one new bank charter in its 2008 fiscal year and none it reports after that (Idaho DOF, FY2008).

The two took opposite paths. One was a hometown bank raised from local investors, which never paid a dividend and sold after twelve years. The other was raised privately with a record amount of capital, is controlled through one LLC, bought two troubled banks, and has grown to $1.45 billion. As with Solera, I describe people by their roles, not their names.

The state they opened into

Idaho had 19 FDIC-insured banks and thrifts headquartered in the state at the end of 2006 and has 10 now (FDIC summary data; my count of commercial banks and savings institutions). Two failed: First Bank of Idaho in Ketchum in April 2009, at an estimated cost to the deposit insurance fund of $109.2 million, and Syringa Bank in Boise in January 2014, at $3.5 million (FDIC failures). The rest mostly merged into larger banks. The state regulator charters Idaho banks only after the FDIC approves deposit insurance, and it says it does "not charge examination fees and process most applications for nominal, or no fees" (Idaho DOF).

Community 1st Bank, Post Falls: the hometown bank

The charter. When the state accepted the application in January 2007, it noted this "would be the first new start-up bank chartered in Post Falls in over 100 years"; the last one had been chartered in 1906 and closed in 1932 (Idaho DOF release). The FDIC approved deposit insurance, the state issued charter number 261, and the bank opened in June 2007 as a state bank supervised by the FDIC, with no holding company. "Organizers raised $10.5 million in initial capitalization through a public stock offering" (Idaho DOF approval); the local paper reported the money came in "in just over two weeks," about 90 percent from Kootenai County investors (Spokesman-Review).

Who and why. The founding chairman and chief executive had 36 years in banking, 26 of them with a large Idaho bank, and had retired the previous summer as president of a Spokane savings bank. The state's director said a "locally owned and operated community bank will enhance community development in the Post Falls area, offer customers an alternative for financial service products, and increase competition" (Idaho DOF release). The founder told the paper that 85 percent of Post Falls deposits sat at large banks, and the hometown bank meant to compete with them (Spokesman-Review).

How it did. The bank lost money its first three years, about $1.1 million in all, and its return on equity never exceeded 8.7 percent. It never paid a cash dividend. It grew to $125 million in assets with 23 employees and four offices, lent mostly to local commercial real estate and businesses, never drew a Federal Home Loan Bank advance, and had no enforcement action in the FDIC's or the Fed's records (FDIC financial data; FDIC orders). Its only Federal Reserve borrowing in the published data was two one-day primary credit loans, $10,000 in 2017 and $100,000 in 2018 (Fed discount window data).

The ending. In 2018 the board hired an investment bank, contacted bidders and chose an all-stock offer from First Interstate. The board's stated reasons included "the costs and burdens of the regulatory environment for community banks, the importance of scale to offset these costs," and "the desire for shareholder liquidity." Directors and executive officers owned 42.27 percent; the chairman and chief executive held the largest stake, 11.70 percent (First Interstate prospectus). The deal closed in April 2019 at $18.8 million (First Interstate 2019 10-K), about 1.3 times the bank's equity and 1.8 times the $10.5 million raised in 2007, eleven years and ten months earlier, with no dividends in between (my arithmetic). The officers' option cash-outs were about $20,000 to $24,000 each, and the filing lists no severance or change-in-control contracts for them.

Western Capital Bank, now Northwest Bank, Boise: the private build

The charter. The FDIC's March 2008 order required that "Beginning paid-in capital funds shall not be less than $35,000,000," with an 11 percent capital ratio for three years and FDIC approval of any change in management or 10 percent ownership before opening (FDIC order). The state called it "a record amount of initial capital for a new state bank in Idaho," raised "through a private stock offering" (Idaho DOF). The bank opened March 31, 2008, the last new bank in Idaho to date.

Who controls it. A January 2008 Federal Register notice shows Western Capital Corporation of Boise and GWY, LLC of Bellevue, Washington applying "to become bank holding companies by acquiring at least 64 percent of the voting shares of Western Capital Bank (in organization)" (Federal Register). The Federal Reserve's structure data still lists GWY at the top, then Western Capital Corporation, then the bank (FFIEC NIC). GWY's current percentage is not in what I could read. The chairman since founding, now also chief executive, is a Bellevue real estate executive who ran a Pacific Northwest homebuilder for 26 years and manages a private investment company; the vice chairman spent three decades at large regional banks and, by the bank's description, "From 2001 through 2007 ... engaged in private equity investing in community banks" (bank board page). The bank's own explanation of why it exists: "Our founders were business people who thought banks should provide financial solutions that fuel success, not roadblocks that hinder it."

An earlier bank investment. Before and after the Boise charter, an LLC managed by the same chairman, Crescent Capital VI, invested in Cowlitz Bancorporation of Longview, Washington. In July 2007 it offered $15.00 a share for all of Cowlitz, which declined. It became the largest shareholder at 29.45 percent and an approved bank holding company, and in an April 2009 letter to the Cowlitz board it criticized brokered deposits that had "increased from 10.6% to 40.5%" and pre-tax losses "in 2007 and 2008 totaling over $14 million" (SEC filing). Its stake later fell from that peak; by mid-June 2010 it held about 14.8 percent (my arithmetic from its filing). The Fed entered into a written agreement with Cowlitz Bancorporation dated June 2, 2010, announced in a press release whose address dates it June 7 (Fed enforcement actions). On June 24 and 25, 2010, after that announcement, Crescent sold 72,454 shares in what its amended 13D calls "open market transactions," leaving it with 0.7 percent (SEC filings for Cowlitz Bancorporation). The Cowlitz Bank failed on July 30, 2010, at an estimated cost to the fund of $31.3 million (FDIC failed bank list). That filing does not give a reason for the sales, and I draw no conclusion from the timing. It notes a "1:10 reverse split effective 3/2/2010," so per-share prices before and after are not comparable, and the LLC's cost basis is not in what I read.

Buying troubled banks. In 2012 the Boise bank merged with Northwest Bank of Lake Oswego, Oregon, took its name, and in 2014 absorbed Regal Financial Bank of Seattle (FDIC history). Both targets had been under FDIC orders: Lake Oswego under a 2010 consent order, terminated in January 2013, after a $9.5 million loss in 2009; Regal under a 2009 cease and desist order and consent order, terminated in January 2013 and October 2011 respectively, after losses in 2009 through 2011 (FDIC orders). Regal's orders had ended before its deal closed; the Lake Oswego order was terminated in January 2013, about five months after that merger. The price for either was not disclosed. Regal's deal was described as a way to "expand its market for small business lending" (American Banker).

What it earns. These are the bank's call report figures, in millions (FDIC financial data):

Scroll to compare columns and rows when the table extends beyond the box.

Year end Assets Deposits Equity Net income Return on equity Employees
2008 $51.6 $18.2 $32.9 minus $1.8 minus 5.3% 12
2012 $264.7 $220.5 $43.0 $3.9 10.4% 43
2016 $521.1 $420.0 $69.8 $5.6 8.5% 86
2020 $980.2 $819.0 $104.8 $10.7 10.9% 89
2024 $1,438.1 $1,096.3 $195.3 $24.4 13.4% 129
2025 $1,475.4 $1,136.5 $224.2 $24.5 11.7% 131

It lost about $3.5 million in its first three years and has been profitable every year since 2011, with a return on equity above 10 percent every year from 2018 through 2025. It mostly kept its earnings: equity grew from $34.4 million at opening to $234.0 million in June 2026, while the bank paid its parent about $10 million in dividends in total (my arithmetic). Its equity is about 16 percent of its assets (my arithmetic from the same data).

How it funds itself. The FDIC classifies it as a commercial lending specialist: at the end of 2025, $392 million of commercial real estate loans, $353 million of business loans and $112 million of construction loans. It is an SBA preferred lender. Beyond customer deposits, it used brokered deposits, which reached $183.4 million at the end of 2024, about 17 percent of deposits, and Federal Home Loan Bank advances, which were highest among year-end reports at $138.7 million at the end of 2023 (FDIC data; percentages my arithmetic).

The holding company borrows. The holding company's parent-only report for 2025 shows $53.8 million of long-term borrowings, which it did not have at the end of 2022, $2.4 million of interest expense, and $981,000 of cash dividends declared to its own shareholders in 2025 (FR Y-9SP, Western Capital Corporation). The bank's equity exceeds the parent's by about $24 million, which means some of the parent's investment in the bank is borrowed money, a pattern the Fed watches and the growth post describes (my arithmetic). The lender and terms are not in what I could read.

Access to public money. On September 12, 2023, the bank borrowed $5 million from the Fed's discount window and $1 million from the Bank Term Funding Program, both for one day; it had also drawn $1,000 from that program in June 2023 (Fed discount window data; BTFP data). It made 816 Paycheck Protection Program loans totaling $237.1 million, with more borrowers in Oregon (231), Washington (226) and Utah (119) than in Idaho (187), and $234.7 million was forgiven (SBA PPP data). Neither Idaho bank took TARP, Small Business Lending Fund or Emergency Capital Investment Program money (Treasury).

No enforcement action against the bank, its holding company or GWY appears in the FDIC's or the Fed's records. Executive pay is not public, because the company files no proxy.

Who benefits

At Community 1st, the sale price was about 1.8 times the capital raised in 2007, paid in First Interstate stock to the shareholders of 2019, after nearly twelve years with no dividends (my arithmetic). The founders built a bank that served Post Falls for about twelve years and chose to sell when the board concluded the costs of staying small were too high. Post Falls lost a locally owned bank to a Montana company.

At Northwest Bank, the controlling LLC and any other holders of the holding company own a bank whose equity has grown more than sixfold, mostly from retained earnings, while the parent has taken on debt and declared dividends in 2025. The bank grew partly by buying two banks that had been under FDIC orders, and much of its PPP lending went outside Idaho. Depositors are protected by FDIC insurance up to the insurance limit, and in September 2023 the bank drew on both the Fed's discount window and the Bank Term Funding Program, each for one day.

For Idaho, the bigger story is the absence. A state that has grown quickly since 2007 has seen no new bank since March 2008, and its count fell from 19 to 10. The charter-cost post explains why: the capital required, the years of supervision and the scale it takes to pay for compliance, the same reasons Community 1st's board gave for selling.

What the record does not show

  • Who invested in Western Capital Bank's private offering, GWY's current stake, and the prices paid for the two banks it absorbed.
  • The lender and terms of the holding company's $53.8 million of debt.
  • Executive and director pay at either bank.
  • Community 1st's offering price per share, so a per-share return cannot be computed.
  • Discount window borrowing after September 2024, which the Fed has not yet published.

Related reading

The pattern under both stories, that the returns go to whoever controls the charter and the capital, is the subject of The W-2 Trap.

Fact-check notes and sources

This post is informational, not legal, tax or investment advice. Figures are reproduced from public filings and public records as of the dates given. Companies are named from the public record as nominative fair use; individuals are described by role. Nothing here alleges wrongdoing by any person or company.

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