How Airline Pilots Actually Get Paid: What Is Written Into the Union Contracts

This is the mechanical companion to the piece on the raise that is written down. That one showed that pilots, dockworkers, and public employees got large raises because their raise was a document rather than a decision. This one opens the document. Every rate, rig, and cap below is cited, and where a figure comes from a press release rather than contract text, I say so. Contract terms change on scheduled dates, and two of the situations described here were unresolved as of July 19, 2026.

The numbers everyone repeats are real. Delta's pilots ratified 34 percent over four years in March 2023. United's followed with cumulative increases reported up to about 40 percent. American's got an immediate raise above 21 percent and total compensation up more than 46 percent. Southwest's ratified roughly 50 percent compounded over five years.

But those figures describe a raise. They do not describe a pay system, and the pay system is the more interesting object. A pilot contract is a several hundred page machine for converting time into money, and most of its cleverness has nothing to do with the headline percentage. It has to do with which hours count, what happens when the company wastes your day, what the airline owes you when it parks you in a hotel, and what the airline is forbidden from outsourcing. If you have ever wondered why a job that is famously well paid also produces famously bitter labor fights, the answer is in the machinery rather than the headline.

Pilots are not paid by the hour. They are paid by the credit hour

Start with the single fact that makes everything else legible. Flight pay runs only while the aircraft is moving, from pushback to parking brake. Boarding, deicing, the two hour weather delay at the gate, the security line, the van to the hotel: none of that is flight time. If pilots were paid purely on block hours, an airline could construct a schedule that kept a crew away from home for four days and paid them for eleven hours.

So the contracts do not pay block hours. They pay credit hours, and credit is computed as the greatest of several competing floors. Those floors are called rigs, and they are the heart of the document.

The duty rig pays a minimum ratio of credit to time on duty. American's Section 15.E.1.b grants one minute of pay and credit for every two minutes of duty between 0600 and 2159, and one minute for every one and a half minutes of duty between 2200 and 0559. Delta's Section 12 J is the same one for two by day and one for one and a half at night. United's is one for two by day and one for one and three quarters at night. That night ratio is the real night premium at all three carriers. There is no separate hourly night differential; the clock simply runs faster in the dark.

The trip rig covers the whole trip rather than a single duty day. All three of the big carriers pay one hour of credit for every three and a half hours away from base, prorated to the minute. A trip that keeps you away from home for eighty four hours pays at least twenty four credit hours no matter how little the airplane actually moved.

The calendar day guarantee sets a floor per day. American's Section 15.G.1 pays a minimum of five hours and fifteen minutes for each calendar day in the sequence, and Delta's Section 12 I uses the same 5:15 figure. American's 2023 agreement added a rig most people never think about: a sequence scheduled to release between midnight and 0159 earns an extra two hours of pay, because a release at 0100 destroys the next day as thoroughly as a release at 0900 but was previously treated as free.

Then there are the smaller ones. American pays a sit rig of one minute for every two minutes of actual ground time beyond two and a half hours, which matters because the earlier contract paid only on scheduled sit time, so every delay was absorbed by the crew rather than the company. Multi duty period sequences carry a two hour minimum per duty period. Deadheading, riding as a passenger to reposition, pays one hundred percent of pay and credit at all three carriers, and American's 2023 book pays the greater of scheduled or actual deadhead time, which was a gain over the prior language.

The practical effect is that the hourly rate is a coefficient, not a wage. Two pilots on the same aircraft at the same rate can earn materially different amounts depending on whose trips are rigged well.

The guarantee, which is the floor under a bad month

Every one of these contracts pays a minimum whether or not the airline gives you the flying.

Delta's Section 4 B.1 guarantees a lineholder the lesser of 65 credit hours or the block hour limitation, with reserve lines guaranteed the average line value minus two hours, floored at 72 hours and capped at 80. American guarantees a lineholder the monthly average line value less seven hours for narrowbody or ten for widebody, and never less than 65, with reserves at 73 hours on long call and 76 on short call.

United restructured this mid contract and ended up with the cleanest version. Before May 2024 it used a daily formula capped at 70 hours. From the May 2024 bid period the contract states that a lineholder whose bid award comes in under seventy hours simply has their pay credit increased to seventy. That is a straightforward hard floor and it sits five hours above Delta's.

American also created something unusual: a blank line with a guarantee, 55 hours of pay and credit with no flying obligation, offered in one, three, or six month increments. It is a contractual way to park surplus pilots without furloughing them.

Per diem, and the difference between a number and a formula

Per diem is expense money for time away from base, paid per hour from report to debrief. The dollar amounts are small and the design is not.

American pays 2.85 dollars an hour domestic and 3.40 international as of the August 2023 baseline, and Section 7.B.1 indexes it every January 1 to the average increase in the government Meal and Incidental Expenses rate across American pilot domicile cities, with an explicit floor that the calculation can never reduce the rate. Delta went further and made the rate itself a formula: 90 percent of the weighted average government rate for the ten mainland cities with the most pilot layovers for domestic, and 60 percent of a theater weighted rate for international. By January 2025 that produced 3.30 domestic and 3.55 international.

United took the other path and wrote fixed dollars into the contract with a 2.5 percent annual escalator, reaching 3.04 domestic and 3.63 international in 2026. Fixed numbers with a fixed escalator are simple, and they lose to an index whenever real costs rise faster than the escalator. Delta's domestic per diem is roughly nine percent above United's for the same year, and the gap came from choosing an index instead of a number. That is the same lesson the COLA piece makes about wages generally, appearing here in miniature.

For contrast, Frontier pays 2.15 an hour for both domestic and international, and Allegiant's current agreement pays 2.00.

The rate tables, and the year one cliff

Rates are set by seat, by aircraft band, and by longevity year, running from year one to year twelve at most carriers. Year twelve is top of scale.

Here is where the major carriers sat on comparable narrowbody equipment, captain at top of scale, at the step in force in mid 2026.

Airline	Narrowbody captain, top of scale	Step in force
Southwest	$394.27	1/1/2026
American	$390.30	1/1/2026
Delta	$388.27	1/1/2026
United	$388.27	1/1/2026
Alaska	$375.74	9/1/2025
JetBlue	$359.40	8/1/2024, frozen

Two things in that table are worth pausing on. Southwest, a single fleet operator with no widebodies at all, holds the highest narrowbody captain rate among the majors. That inverts the usual assumption that the legacy carriers lead on pay. And JetBlue's rates are flat because JetBlue is in negotiations, which is what a contract looks like when the escalators have run out and the next one has not been agreed.

Now look at the other end of the scale, because it is the part nobody quotes. Under American's 2023 agreement, a first year first officer earned 108.34 dollars per credit hour, and that rate was identical on every aircraft in the fleet, from an Embraer 175 to a Boeing 777. A twelfth year captain on that 777 earned 417.54. The same contract, the same cockpit, and a spread of nearly four to one driven entirely by seat and seniority.

The steepness is the point. Seniority in this industry is close to absolute, it does not transfer between airlines, and it governs pay, aircraft, schedule, base, and vacation. A pilot who changes carriers restarts at the bottom of that table. That single structural fact explains more about pilot behavior, and about why a seniority list integration in a merger becomes a years long fight, than any pay percentage.

First officer, captain, and what "junior" actually means

Before the dollar figures, the vocabulary, because two different things get called seniority and they are not the same.

The positions are seats. A First Officer sits in the right seat and is the co-pilot. A Captain sits in the left seat and is pilot in command. A Second Officer, historically the flight engineer, is a third crew member that has largely disappeared but still exists at UPS, which publishes a full second officer pay scale to this day. Long haul flights carry relief officers so the operating crew can rest, which is why FedEx's contract sets a separate international override for a relief first officer.

Junior and senior are not positions. They describe where a pilot sits on the seniority list, which is a single number assigned on date of hire and which governs almost everything: which seat you can hold, which aircraft, which base, which schedule, and which vacation weeks. A junior pilot is a recently hired one. A senior pilot is one who has been there a long time. You can be a twelve year first officer at a carrier with slow upgrades and a two year captain at one with fast upgrades, and the twelve year first officer will often earn less.

Two more distinctions change the money directly. A lineholder bids and holds a published monthly schedule. A reserve is on call and gets a different, usually higher, guarantee because the airline is buying availability rather than flying. And a Direct Entry Captain is a regional hire brought straight into the left seat because they already have the hours, which is the role most of the big regional bonuses were built to fill.

There are also premium roles layered on top. Check airmen, instructors, and aircrew program designees earn dollar overrides on top of the hourly rate. United's, for example, escalate to 2,100 dollars for an aircrew program designee and 1,910 for a check airman.

What that actually pays, by the week, the month, and the year

Nobody in this industry is paid weekly, so the weekly column below is just the annual figure divided by 52. It is there because it is the number most people think in.

Two columns matter. At guarantee is the contractual floor, what the airline owes even in a thin month. At a full line assumes 85 credit hours, which is a normal working month for a pilot holding a line and picking up a little. Real pilots land between the two, and a pilot who flies a lot of premium or international time lands above both.

Junior, the first year:

Carrier and seat	Rate	Per week	Per month	Per year
Allegiant FO, current contract	$57.67	$932	$4,037	$48,443
SkyWest FO (regional)	$92.73	$1,605	$6,955	$83,457
Envoy FO (regional)	$99.00	$1,713	$7,425	$89,100
PSA FO (regional)	$102.00	$1,765	$7,650	$91,800
Endeavor FO (regional)	$105.08	$1,819	$7,881	$94,572
Allegiant FO, pending agreement	$107.28	$1,733	$7,510	$90,115
Delta or United FO (major)	$125.52	$1,883	$8,159	$97,906

Regionals shown at their 75 hour guarantee, majors at 65, Allegiant at 70.

Senior, top of scale:

Carrier and seat	Rate	Per week (at 85)	Per month (at 85)	Per year (at 85)
PSA captain, regional top of scale	$228.75	$4,487	$19,444	$233,325
Delta FO, year 12 narrowbody	$265.19	$5,202	$22,541	$270,494
Delta captain, year 12 narrowbody	$388.27	$7,616	$33,003	$396,035
Southwest captain, top of scale	$394.27	$7,734	$33,513	$402,155
UPS captain, year 15	$401.01	$7,866	$34,086	$409,030
FedEx captain, year 15 widebody	$469.00	$9,200	$39,865	$478,380
Delta captain, year 12 widebody	$483.74	$9,489	$41,118	$493,415

Read those two tables together and the shape of the career is obvious. A first year regional first officer and a senior widebody captain are doing recognisably the same job in the same airspace, and one earns roughly six times the other.

Three things are deliberately excluded above, and all three push the real number higher. Per diem is paid on top and is expense money rather than wages. Profit sharing is paid on top, and at Delta it has run over a billion dollars a year across the workforce. Retirement is paid on top, and it is large enough to deserve its own section.

One more figure worth sitting with, because it is the single strangest number in any of these contracts. A UPS pilot in their first year earns 59.77 dollars an hour in every seat, captain, first officer, and second officer alike. In year fifteen those same three seats pay 401.01, 284.29, and 209.72.

The part a salaried reader should actually envy

Here is where the comparison to a normal job stops being close.

A Delta or United pilot receives a company retirement contribution of 18 percent of earnings in 2026, non elective. Non elective means the pilot contributes nothing to receive it. It is not a match. It arrives whether or not the pilot puts in a dime, and it vests immediately.

A typical private sector 401(k) works the opposite way. A common design is a 50 percent match on the first 6 percent of pay, which means the employer contributes 3 percent, and only if the worker first diverts 6 percent of their own salary to earn it.

Run the same gross through both:

Gross pay	Pilot: employer puts in	Pilot must contribute	W-2 worker: employer puts in	W-2 worker must contribute	Free-money gap
$100,000	$18,000	$0	$3,000	$6,000	$15,000
$200,000	$36,000	$0	$6,000	$12,000	$30,000
$300,000	$54,000	$0	$9,000	$18,000	$45,000
$400,000	$63,000	$0	$12,000	$24,000	$51,000

The employer contribution is roughly six times larger, and the pilot is not required to fund any of it. The salaried worker's smaller amount is conditional on giving up part of their own paycheck first.

Two details make it wider still. The pilot can also defer their own money on top, up to the 2026 elective limit of 24,500 dollars, so the pilot's total annual retirement funding can reach the low sixty thousands while the salaried worker at the same gross reaches eighteen. And because 18 percent of a large salary blows past the federal limits on a qualified plan, these contracts route the overflow into a cash balance plan or pay it out in cash rather than letting it disappear, which is a problem most workers never get to have.

Put it the other way around, which is the version that lands. To receive the same 36,000 dollars of employer retirement money that a 200,000 dollar pilot gets for free, a W-2 worker on a 3 percent effective match would need a salary of 1.2 million dollars.

And compound just the gap, ignoring the pilot's own contributions entirely. Thirty years of that 30,000 dollar annual difference at 7 percent is roughly 2.8 million dollars. At the 400,000 dollar level it is about 4.8 million. That is the retirement account the salaried worker never opens, and it is invisible on a salary comparison because it never appears in either person's stated pay.

This is the same argument the COLA piece makes about wages, moved to the benefits column, and it is bigger here than it is there.

What it costs to get to the left seat

None of the above is free, and the entry cost is the reason the supply stays tight.

The hours. Federal law requires 1,500 flight hours for an airline transport pilot certificate. There are reductions for structured pathways: 750 hours for military pilots, 1,000 for a bachelor's degree with an aviation major, and 1,250 for an associate's degree or a bachelor's with fewer aviation credits. Then, separately, a pilot needs 1,000 hours as second in command at a Part 121 carrier before serving as captain there. Minimum age is 21 for the restricted certificate and 23 for the unrestricted one.

The money. ATP Flight School, one of the largest academies, publishes fixed tuition of 123,995 dollars starting from zero time, or 100,995 with credit for solo experience and 90,995 with a private pilot certificate already in hand. On top of the tuition it lists roughly 12,000 dollars in examiner and knowledge test fees, about 12,000 dollars in apps and gear, and up to 5,000 dollars in training center premiums. That is on the order of 150,000 dollars before a pilot has flown a paying passenger, and the tuition buys certificates rather than the 1,500 hours, which most candidates accumulate afterward by instructing at low pay.

The other costs, which are not measured in dollars. Seniority does not transfer, so changing airlines means starting at the bottom of the pay scale and the schedule again. Retirement is mandatory at 65 by federal rule regardless of health or willingness. And the entire career rests on holding a first class medical certificate that can be revoked, which is why American's 2023 contract added up to 5,000 dollars per procedure and 10,000 dollars lifetime toward treatment needed to get one back.

So the honest version of the first table is worse than it looks. A newly hired regional first officer earning 83,457 dollars has typically spent six figures and several years getting there, and will spend a further stretch at first year rates before the scale starts to move. The 480,000 dollar widebody captain is the same person twenty years later.

The snap-up clause, or why three airlines pay nearly the same number

Here is the most interesting thing in any of these documents, and it almost never gets written about.

At the January 1, 2025 step, the top of scale captain rate on the largest widebodies was 465.13 dollars at Delta, at United, and at American. Identical to the cent. First officers were 317.73 at all three. At January 1, 2026 all three moved to 483.74 and 330.44.

That is not imitation. It is a ratchet, written into the contracts on purpose.

Delta ratified first, in March 2023, and knew it would be passed. So the Delta agreement contains Section 3 B.5, a me too clause: if United or American later signs an agreement with a higher top of scale captain rate on its highest paying aircraft, every Delta pay table rises by the size of the gap plus an additional one percent. United ratified in September 2023 at a slightly higher number, and the clause fired. Delta's own MEC records the outcome plainly: United triggered a two percent raise, American did not. The arithmetic confirms it, since Delta's published table rate of 455.96 multiplied by 1.0201 gives exactly 465.13.

United's contract contains its own snap-up, which produced a table literally labeled "after Snap Up," worth about one percent. American's contains a Section 3.H pay adjustment estimated by the union at about two percent, plus a provision that would convert American's May 2 escalation dates to January 1 if United ratified before January 1, 2024. United did ratify in September 2023. ALPA's own September 2025 cross carrier comparison lists American's increases as occurring each January 1 through 2027, which is the evidence that the acceleration took effect.

And then there is the detail that makes the pattern undeniable. United's contract creates a narrowbody global override whose trigger is defined by reference to "Section 3-A-10 of the Delta PWA effective March 2, 2023." One airline's pay provision is indexed to the text of a different airline's union contract.

So the accurate story is not that American and Southwest copied Delta. It is that Delta set a floor, United cleared it, and Delta's ratchet pulled Delta back up to exact parity. Three companies that compete fiercely for passengers ended up with a single national pay scale, because their unions wrote clauses that made divergence automatically self correcting.

There is a sting in the tail. Delta's rates stop increasing on January 1, 2026, its amendable date, and Section 3 B.5 explicitly becomes null and void that same day. American and United both take another step on January 1, 2027, to 498.25 for a widebody captain. Absent a new agreement, the airline that set the pattern ends its contract about three percent below the two carriers it forced to match it. That gap, not general grievance, is the engine behind Delta ALPA's "Contract 2026" campaign.

Retirement, where the numbers get genuinely large

The retirement provisions are the part of these contracts that a salaried reader should look at hardest, because they are not a match.

Delta's Section 26 C.2 sets a non elective company contribution of 16 percent of earnings, rising to 17 percent on January 1, 2024 and 18 percent on January 1, 2026. United's Section 22-A-1-a sets 16, then 17 with the January 2024 bid period, then 18 with the January 2026 bid period. American's Supplement F(8) sets the same ladder on May 2 dates, subject to the same acceleration clause. All three land on 18 percent.

Non elective means the pilot contributes nothing to receive it. At the 2025 compensation limit of 350,000 dollars, an 18 percent company contribution is 63,000 dollars in a single year, into one person's retirement account, with no employee deferral required and immediate vesting. Because that overshoots the federal limits on contributions to a qualified plan, the contracts route the excess into a market based cash balance plan or a health reimbursement arrangement rather than letting it evaporate into taxable cash.

Frontier's, for comparison, is disclosed in the airline's own annual report: the company match was eliminated and replaced with a non elective contribution ranging from 12 to 15 percent over the term of the agreement. Allegiant's pending tentative agreement would move to a 15 percent direct contribution from January 2027, also with no employee contribution required.

Set that against the private sector norm of a three to six percent match that requires the worker to fund it first, and the gap is larger than the wage gap.

Profit sharing, which is also a Delta document

The formula is the same at Delta, United, and American: ten percent of pre tax earnings up to 2.5 billion dollars, plus twenty percent of pre tax earnings above that threshold, allocated pro rata by eligible earnings. United's contract adopts it in nearly verbatim language for 2023 and beyond, replacing a prior plan worth five percent of pre tax profit. American's Section 3.G.3.a uses the same structure, and American's annual report confirms the formula was adopted company wide rather than for pilots alone.

The payouts show why the formula matters more than the percentage. Delta's profit sharing expense ran 1,383 million dollars in 2023, 1,389 million in 2024, and 1,337 million in 2025. American's company wide accrual over the same three years was 261 million, then 228 million, then 55 million. Same formula, same industry, wildly different outcome, because twenty percent of the amount above 2.5 billion is worth a great deal at an airline that clears the threshold and nothing at an airline that does not.

Frontier's pilots have no profit sharing at all.

The cargo tier, and the last real pension in the industry

Freight pilots are usually described as trailing passenger pilots on pay while leading on retirement. That was true for a long time, and 2026 is the year it stopped being true.

FedEx is the clearest case, and it is also the best argument for reading a contract closely before voting on it. FedEx pilots rejected a tentative agreement in July 2023 by 57 percent to 43 percent, on a turnout of 5,119 votes out of 5,172 eligible. The sore point was back pay. That agreement offered a captain a total of 30,450 dollars to cover an amendable period that had already run 21 months.

They ratified a new agreement on June 9, 2026, with 83 percent in favor on 98.5 percent turnout, effective June 29, 2026 and amendable at the end of the December 2030 bid period. The recovery payment in the ratified deal is a total of 150,000 dollars for a captain and 102,500 for a first officer, covering November 2, 2021 through June 28, 2026. That is roughly five times the offer they turned down. Pay rose 39.76 percent at signing, with three further increases of three percent, taking a top of scale widebody captain from 469.00 dollars per hour to 512.48 by 2030.

Rejecting a contract cost those pilots three additional years under 2015 pay rates. It also bought them about 120,000 dollars per captain in back pay and roughly ten additional points of wage increase. Both of those things are true at once, which is what makes it an honest example rather than a lesson.

UPS is where the old rule still holds. Its roughly 3,400 pilots are represented by the Independent Pilots Association, and their agreement became amendable on September 1, 2025. They are in mediation with no tentative agreement. Two features stand out. First, UPS pays by seat and longevity only, with no aircraft type differential at all, so a top of scale captain earns 401.01 dollars an hour whether the airplane is a 747 or an A300. Second, and much more unusually, UPS pilots still accrue a traditional defined benefit pension, a monthly benefit of one percent of final average earnings times years of service up to a thirty year cap, or a flat dollar amount times years of service, whichever is greater. UPS froze accruals for its non union participants in January 2023. The pilots, being union, were not included. On top of that sits a twelve percent money purchase contribution and a 401(k) with no company match, because the twelve percent is the company money.

That makes UPS pilots very likely the last major US airline pilot group still building a traditional pension. FedEx's 2026 agreement raised its own pension cap to 340,000 dollars for existing pilots and closed the plan to new hires as of the signing date, which is the classic shape of a defined benefit plan in its final phase: better for the people already inside, unavailable to anyone arriving after.

Below the two integrators sits a third tier that gets lost when people say "cargo." The ACMI carriers that fly wet lease freight, Atlas Air, Kalitta, ABX, and Air Transport International, run roughly 30 to 40 percent below FedEx and UPS and have no defined benefit plan at all. A top of scale Atlas 747 captain was at 332.68 dollars an hour in September 2025 against FedEx's 469.00. Lumping those carriers in with the integrators is the most common analytical error in this subject.

ACMI, where the divisor is the paycheck

That paragraph is the shortest one in this piece and the one I am least satisfied with. Both of its claims need more behind them, and what sits behind them turns out to be more interesting than the claim was.

Start with what an ACMI carrier sells, because in this tier the customer's contract reaches the crew's paycheck more directly than anywhere else in the industry. Atlas Air Worldwide's own glossary, in the last annual report the company ever filed, describes the ACMI service as providing an aircraft, crew, maintenance and insurance while the customer assumes fuel, demand and price risk. CMI is the same arrangement with the airplane taken out: crew, line maintenance and insurance only. In both versions the customer has already fixed the block hour price in a long term contract. The carrier cannot reprice when its costs move, cannot fill the airplane better, and cannot chase a stronger market, because the market belongs to somebody else. Crew cost is the largest line it still controls, and it sits inside a price it did not set.

That is a structurally different labor market from the one FedEx and UPS pilots work in, not a discount version of the same one. An integrator sells a package moving door to door, and the airplane is a cost inside its own product. An ACMI carrier sells block hours into another company's product. Air Transport Services Group, the parent of ABX Air, Air Transport International and Omni Air, put three customers at 76 percent of its 2024 revenue: Amazon at 33 percent, the Department of Defense at 29, and DHL at 14. Its own competition discussion states the mechanism without embarrassment, that the cost of airline operations is significantly impacted by the cost of flight crewmembers and can vary among airlines depending on their collective bargaining agreements. When three buyers set the price, the crew line is where the difference gets absorbed.

The margins say the squeeze is real rather than theoretical. ATSG's ACMI Services segment, which is the actual flying, earned 0.7 million dollars before tax in 2024 across 97 in service aircraft, down from 32.0 million the year before. The money in that group is in CAM, the leasing arm. Owning the airplanes pays, and crewing them barely does, which is the toll economy argument playing out inside a single corporate group.

Now the pay engine, which is the part the 30 to 40 percent figure does not reach.

Recall that the rig is what converts time into credit. ALPA's own cross carrier cargo comparison, published in September 2023, lays the trip rigs side by side, and the spread is enormous.

Carrier	Trip rig, credit hours per hour away from base
FedEx	1 for 3.75
UPS	1 for 3.75
Amerijet	1 for 4
Sun Country	1 for 4.2
Atlas Air	1 for 4.95
Air Transport International	1 for 6.4
Kalitta	none
ABX Air	none

FedEx layers duty rigs on top of that, one for two, one for 1.92 and one for 1.5 depending on the time of day, and UPS carries a one for two duty rig. Atlas has no duty rig at all. Its contract puts the entire question in a single sentence, that a crew member receives credit equal to one hour for every 4.95 hours of calculated rig time, and there is nothing else underneath a long day on the ground. FedEx's rig figures here are ALPA's September 2023 reading and predate the agreement FedEx pilots ratified in June 2026, so pair them with the 2026 rate as indicative rather than as a matched set.

So run the same trip through both books. Fifteen days away from base is 360 hours. A FedEx pilot books 96 credit hours. An Atlas pilot books 72.7. At the top of scale rates already in this piece, 469.00 dollars against 332.68, that is 45,024 dollars at FedEx and about 24,195 at Atlas for the identical fifteen days away from home. Atlas pays 54 cents on the FedEx dollar.

The hourly rate accounts for less than half of that. The rate gap is 29 percent. The rig then cuts a further 24 percent off what is left, and the two compound to about 46. On this trip and at these two seats the discount is closer to 46 percent than to 30, and it only opens that far if you read the divisor rather than the rate table. The 30 to 40 percent range still describes what it was always measuring, which is the rate tables. It also describes a tier, and this comparison does not: Kalitta and ABX Air carry no trip rig at all, and Air Transport International's is 1 for 6.4, so there is no single ACMI divisor to generalize from.

The divisor matters more than the rate for a reason that shows up in the operating statistics. Atlas flew 328,050 block hours in 2022 with about 2,700 pilots. Even assuming a four person augmented crew on every single departure, that is under 41 block hours per pilot per month against a monthly guarantee of 64. Most Atlas pilots are therefore paid on the rig or on the guarantee, and hardly any of them are paid on block time. The advertised hourly rate is a coefficient applied to a number the rig produced.

The rest of the Atlas book compounds it in the same direction:

• The guarantee is 64 hours a bid month, against the 72 used here for the cargo integrators and the 75 a UPS lineholder gets on a 28 day bid period. Instructors get 74.
• Deadhead pays half. A pilot repositioning on a company aircraft, a commercial flight or by surface transportation is credited and paid on a one for two basis. The majors pay deadhead at 100 percent, and so, per ALPA's comparison, does ABX Air on company aircraft. The treatment is not uniform even inside the ACMI group.
• Days off are 14 in a 31 day bid month and 13 in a 30 day month, and a pilot can be involuntarily assigned up to 17 consecutive duty days before an intervening block of four consecutive days off is required.
• There is an out base assignment with no counterpart at a passenger airline. A pilot may volunteer to be stationed away from base for an entire bid month, and the contract says flatly that such an assignment will have no scheduled or required days off except as may be required by the federal rules. It is capped at seven percent of the crew members on a fleet type and paid against a 130 hour guarantee, which at the top of scale 747 captain rate is 43,248 dollars for the month. That is the tier's actual bargain in one clause: the money is available, and the way to reach it is to stop going home.

One provision runs the other way and deserves credit. Atlas provides company-paid travel to and from an assignment out of a designated gateway airport within 130 miles of a pilot's residence, from a list of 190 named airports. Nothing at a passenger carrier looks quite like it, and it exists because the operation has very few bases and almost no domestic pattern flying, so the commute is the company's problem by necessity rather than by generosity.

Retirement is where the tier separates from the integrators most sharply, and the earlier sentence about no defined benefit plan needs to be stated more precisely than I stated it. No pilot at any of these carriers has accrued a defined benefit since 2009. ABX Air's flight crewmembers do have a qualified plan and ATSG still sponsors it, but the company's last annual report says employees are no longer accruing benefits under any of them and that each plan was frozen during 2009. The remaining service to retirement for the crewmember population was estimated at 2.64 years. It is a plan in its closing act, not a benefit anyone is building. ALPA's own table records an A Plan at exactly two of the ten cargo carriers it surveys, FedEx and UPS, with Atlas, ABX, Amerijet, Air Transport International, Kalitta, Hawaiian, Omni and Sun Country all listed as not applicable.

What Atlas pilots have instead is a 401(k) assembled in a way that flatters the headline. The company adds a two percent non elective contribution, and it matches what the pilot puts in dollar for dollar, with the pilot's own contribution counted only up to ten percent of gross pay. ALPA's cross carrier table records the combination as twelve percent. Set that beside the 18 percent non elective contribution Delta and United pay in 2026 and the twelve looks respectable. Then read how it is built. Two of those twelve points arrive whatever the pilot does. The other ten only exist if the pilot funds them first. Kalitta, of all carriers, pays a twelve percent company contribution with no pilot contribution required, which makes its retirement structure better than Atlas's despite Kalitta having no trip rig or duty rig whatsoever. The tier is not internally consistent, and nobody should describe it as a single wage floor.

Profit sharing carries the same design signature. Atlas pays ten percent of pre tax profits, but the contract first subtracts a deductible, in its own words that for each plan year pre tax profits will be reduced by 50 million dollars. The formula shared by Delta, United and American takes ten percent of everything up to 2.5 billion and twenty percent above it, with nothing taken off the top. That deductible is not a rounding adjustment, it is a threshold, and in a soft year it is the entire plan.

Per diem is the one line where the tier barely matters, and the reason is obvious once you see it. Atlas started at 2.75 dollars an hour in the contiguous states and 3.50 outside them, rising ten cents every January 1 up to and including January 1, 2026, which puts it at 3.25 and 4.00 today. That sits above United's 2026 domestic figure and just under Delta's. A hotel meal costs what it costs regardless of whose freight is in the back. The difference is that Delta's number is a formula and will keep moving, while Atlas's stops on January 1, 2026 and never moves again.

Which is the fact that matters most about this contract right now. Every economic escalator in it has already fired. The pay tables stop at September 1, 2025. Per diem stops at January 1, 2026. The year 2026 appears exactly twice in the 353 page agreement, once as that per diem ceiling and once on the cover page as the amendable date. A pilot at Atlas today is working under a contract that has finished paying out everything it was ever going to pay.

Two more structural notes, because they will matter to anyone reading this after the next round.

The contract already prices airplanes nobody has ordered yet. Article 32 sets pay by maximum takeoff weight band rather than by negotiation. Anything from 375,000 to 500,000 kilograms pays 747 rates, 250,000 to 375,000 pays 777 rates, 125,000 to 250,000 pays 767 rates, and only an aircraft between 500,000 and 625,000 kilograms earns a premium, at 108.03 percent of 747 rates. Above 625,000 the weight bands stop applying altogether. On March 16, 2026, Atlas Air Worldwide ordered 20 Airbus A350F freighters with options for 20 more, deliveries running from 2029 to 2034. The airplane's weight, not a bargaining table, will decide what it pays. I have not been able to confirm the A350F's maximum takeoff weight from Airbus, so I am not going to guess which band it lands in, but the band is already written.

And nobody outside these companies can check any of this against a financial statement any more. Atlas Air Worldwide was taken private on March 17, 2023 at 102.50 dollars a share by an entity affiliated with funds managed by affiliates of Apollo Global Management, J.F. Lehman & Company and Hill City Capital, financed in part with 850 million dollars of 8.500 percent senior secured notes due 2030 issued by the acquisition parent and guaranteed by the holding company and certain of its subsidiaries on a first priority secured basis. It deregistered eleven days later, and its FY2022 annual report is the last full public picture of the company that exists. Air Transport Services Group followed, taken private by Stonepeak on April 11, 2025 at 22.50 dollars a share and deregistered ten days after that. Kalitta is family held and never filed anything. As of 2025 the entire ACMI tier sits outside public disclosure, and it did not before.

For the record, the last public numbers Atlas ever published make the labor share of this business perfectly legible. Salaries, wages and benefits were 1,135.2 million dollars in 2022 against 4,549.1 million of operating revenue, almost exactly a quarter, and the company attributed the 22.8 percent jump to pilot costs under the new arbitrated agreement. That agreement, it wrote in the same document, meant all of its pilots were receiving significantly higher pay, quality of life improvements and enhanced benefits. Both of those statements are true, and the pilots covered by them still book one credit hour for every 4.95 hours away from their families.

Five weeks from amendable, with nothing on the record

The Atlas agreement is effective September 10, 2021 and amendable September 10, 2026. Both dates are printed on the cover page of the signed book. As I write this, the second one is about five weeks away.

Nothing expires on that date. Under the Railway Labor Act, described further down, the agreement stays in force and both parties stay bound by it until a new one is reached. What changes is only that either side may serve a Section 6 notice and open negotiations. The Atlas pilots' own history is the clearest available proof of the difference, since the last round ran roughly five years past its amendable date and ended with an arbitrator writing the contract rather than the parties agreeing to one.

So the useful question five weeks out is what the public record shows about the round that is starting. The answer is essentially nothing, and I think that is the finding rather than a failure to find one.

Teamsters Local 2750, which represents more than 2,800 Atlas pilots, keeps a public post archive of 68 items. The most recent negotiating post on its Negotiating Committee page is titled Final JCBA Proposals Submitted and is dated February 16, 2021, which is to say it belongs to the last round. Its News Wire, which is where the union actually talks to its members, runs to Issue 253 dated April 24, 2026, and every issue sits behind a member login. The Teamsters national newsroom has published nothing about the Atlas pilots' bargaining since the October 1, 2019 announcement that Local 2750 had been formed, though the local turns up in later member services items. Atlas Air Worldwide's own newsroom carries seven press releases in 2026, covering the A350F order, an investment in Air Atlanta announced in May and completed on August 3, a sustainability report, an aircraft sale, an aircraft acquisition and a new chief people officer appointed on April 27. None of them mentions pilots, the Teamsters, labor or negotiations, and because the company no longer files with the Securities and Exchange Commission there is no risk factor or labor note to read either. The National Mediation Board's FY2025 annual report lists Atlas with the Teamsters only under training, and under no docketed or closed mediation case, which is exactly what you would expect of a round that has not started, since mediation only comes after direct bargaining stalls.

Two cautions before anyone reads that silence as a story. A Section 6 notice is served between the parties and is not filed with any agency, so a notice could have been served privately and no public trace would exist. And the precedent from the last round says the notice arrives at the amendable date rather than months ahead of it: the Teamsters served theirs on Atlas Air and Southern Air on February 16, 2016.

What the union has chosen to put in public is not a pay demand. It is a counter. Local 2750's home page carries a live pilot resignation tally, restamped as the number moves. When I read it, it stood at 127 resignations so far this year against 157 for the whole of last year, with 13 logged for the prior month, 9 for the current one and 2 already booked for the next. It will read differently by the time you check, and the direction is the point. At a group of 2,800, last year's figure alone is roughly one pilot in eighteen walking out the door, and this year is running ahead of that pace. Publishing that number on the front page five weeks before the amendable date is an argument aimed at the company, and it is the argument that a pay engine built around a 4.95 divisor and a 64 hour guarantee has a retention cost the block hour contracts do not show.

A negotiating committee is seated and named publicly: Doug Malcolm as chairman, with Keith Carbine, Brian Fuentes, Heath Martin, Drue Overby and Mikko Tuomi. Three of those six also sit on the seven member executive board, which tells you how thin the bench is at a local this size, and how much of the work in the coming round will fall on very few people.

Now the part that I think is the real story, and it is the thing the arbitration paragraph further down only gestures at. Atlas pilots have had two consecutive contracts written by an arbitrator rather than agreed at a table. That is not a procedural detail. Every provision in the preceding section, the 4.95 divisor, the absent duty rig, the 64 hour guarantee, deadhead at half credit, 17 consecutive duty days, the 50 million dollar deductible before profit sharing begins, arrived through an award rather than through a bargain that either side agreed to sign. Neither party owns them, which means neither has the usual incentive to defend them, and it also means the union has never once demonstrated that it can extract anything through pressure, because it has never been permitted to apply any. Self help was legally unavailable to these pilots the entire time. An arbitrated contract is a contract with no bargaining history, and a bargaining history is most of what a union brings to the next round.

The comparison cases sit inside the same tier and point in opposite directions. Air Transport International's pilots went amendable on March 21, 2021 and stayed there. ATSG's last annual report, covering 2024, said roughly 20 percent of its employees were parties to agreements that were now amendable and that the parties had jointly sought mediation at the National Mediation Board. That 20 percent covers four units at two of its airlines, not the ATI pilots alone. Their ALPA council's public home page now carries a Contract Ratified banner and a June 25, 2026 note that with the completion of contract negotiations they were finally able to schedule grievance mediation with the Board, which puts ratification at roughly five years past amendable. The council's own hotline and the contract documents are behind a member login, so I have no rates, no duration and no amendable date for that agreement, and the banner's stated ratification day does not match the 2026 calendar, so I am not going to print a precise date for it.

Kalitta went the other way. ALPA's September 2023 comparison notes that its pilots were entering Section 6 roughly a year early, with 2.5 percent annual increases running through 2024, although ALPA's own later account puts that opener at eighteen months early instead. ALPA's press room also carries a May 2026 item titled Kalitta Air Pilots Receive $2 Million Grant for Contract Negotiations. alpa.org would not serve it to me, but a verbatim reprint puts it at a unanimous 2 million dollar grant from ALPA's Major Contingency Fund for roughly 950 pilots, with 21 of 28 contract sections tentatively agreed. That is ALPA's account rather than mine. ABX Air, meanwhile, is not amendable until January 2, 2030.

Which disposes of the last false idea about this tier, the one that treats it as a single bargaining bloc. It is four employers, two unions and four separate contract clocks. Atlas pilots are Teamsters. ABX and Omni pilots are Teamsters. Air Transport International's pilots are ALPA, and so are Kalitta's, having left the Teamsters for ALPA in February 2018 after the 2016 round ended in impasse. There is no pattern to follow here and no lead carrier to follow it from, which is another way of saying that the compounding advantage the Delta snap-up clause gave the passenger majors has no counterpart in cargo below the two integrators. And the whole tier is small: roughly 2,800 Atlas pilots and about 1,120 flight crewmembers across the three ATSG airlines, against the 5,172 eligible voters in the FedEx pilot group alone.

So there are exactly two things a reader can watch from outside, and neither of them is a negotiation. One is the resignation counter on the union's home page, which is the only continuously published measurement of how this pay engine is performing. The other is the fleet, where 20 firm A350Fs and 20 options are already scheduled against an article of the contract that prices new airplanes by weight rather than by agreement. The round itself will happen where the last two happened, out of sight, and the first most people will hear of it is when somebody announces the result.

Scope, the clause that is not about money

If you read only one section of a pilot contract, read scope. It is the provision that says how much of the airline's flying may be handed to a regional carrier with lower pay, and it determines the number of mainline jobs that exist.

The industry ceiling is consistent: regional aircraft are capped at 76 seats and 86,000 pounds maximum takeoff weight. The caps below that ceiling differ in an instructive way.

Delta and United cap by count. Delta permits up to 125 aircraft in the 0 to 50 seat class, 102 in the 51 to 70 class, and 223 in the 71 to 76 class. United permits unlimited turboprops at 37 seats or fewer, up to 102 in the 51 to 70 class, and 153 in the 71 to 76 class.

American caps by ratio, which is the more elegant design. Its regional fleet in the 31 to 65 seat class may not exceed 75 percent of the number of mainline narrowbodies in service, and the 66 to 76 seat class may not exceed 40 percent. Because the cap floats against the mainline fleet, shrinking mainline automatically shrinks the permitted regional fleet. A company cannot quietly substitute one for the other. American's Section 1.D.4.f closes the obvious loophole by forbidding the transfer of any aircraft type in the mainline fleet, or any order or option for one, to a commuter carrier. And Section 1.D.3 gives the union an option to terminate the entire commuter exception if the mainline pilot count ever falls below 7,300.

Both Delta and United attach a furlough trigger, which is the real teeth. If Delta furloughs any pilot who was on the seniority list as of March 2, 2023, the cap on 71 to 76 seat aircraft drops to zero. At United, furloughing a pilot hired before September 29, 2023 converts every 76 seat aircraft in the system to 70 seats. These clauses make a furlough extraordinarily expensive, which is the entire idea.

American layers on geography too. At least 85 percent of regional jet departures must touch Dallas Fort Worth, Chicago O'Hare, Miami, Los Angeles, or Kennedy, and regional nonstop service between those five airports is capped at 1.25 percent of total scheduled block hours. Regional flying is confined to feeding the hubs rather than replacing trunk routes.

None of this appears in a pay table, and all of it determines how many pilots hold a mainline job, how fast they upgrade to captain, and therefore what every rate in the contract is actually worth.

The regionals, and the rule that briefly handed them all the leverage

The other side of the scope clause is the regional carrier, and in 2022 the regionals experienced the single most dramatic wage event in modern American labor.

The setup starts with a crash. On February 12, 2009, Colgan Air flight 3407, operating as Continental Connection, stalled on approach to Buffalo and came down on a house in Clarence Center, New York, killing all 49 people aboard and one person on the ground. Congress responded with the Airline Safety and FAA Extension Act of 2010, whose Section 217(c)(1) says the total flight hours required shall be at least 1,500. The FAA implemented it in 2013, with reduced thresholds for military pilots at 750 hours and for aviation degree holders at 1,000 or 1,250.

The 1,500 hour rule gets all the attention, but a second regulation does more of the work. Under 14 CFR 121.436, a pilot cannot serve as captain at a Part 121 carrier without 1,000 hours as second in command in those operations. That is why 2022 produced a captain shortage specifically rather than a general pilot shortage, and it is why every regional retention bonus is built around the upgrade rather than the hire.

When the mainlines resumed hiring hard after the pandemic, they drew captains out of the regionals faster than the regionals could produce them. The regionals could not staff the flying their capacity purchase agreements obligated them to fly. What happened next, in the space of five months in 2022, was extraordinary:

• Piedmont, June 11: first year captain pay from 78 to 146 dollars an hour, an 87 percent increase, and first year first officer pay from 51 to 90, a 76 percent increase.
• Envoy and PSA, June: a 50 percent Pilot Supply Premium added to every compensable hour, layered on a modestly raised base scale.
• SkyWest, September: first year first officer pay from roughly 46 to 90 dollars, and first year CRJ captain pay from roughly 76 to 140.
• Republic, October: first officers up 70 to 90 percent, ratified by 91.5 percent of participating pilots, and the only one of these deals whose own announcement stressed that the increases were permanent, with no snap back provisions.

Now the part that explains all of it. SkyWest's own annual report states that during 2022 it amended its capacity purchase agreements with its major airline partners in a way that produced higher compensation to cover the increased pilot pay rates. The mainlines funded the regional raises. The regionals were the party at the table, but they were not the party paying, which is why the increases arrived so fast and so uniformly.

The Government Accountability Office tracked first year regional first officer pay across twelve carriers: about 45 dollars an hour in 2017, about 52 in 2021, about 91 in 2023, and about 93 in 2024. Most of the movement happened in a two year window, and then it stopped.

That leaves a strange result which is worth stating precisely, because it is usually reported wrong in both directions. Entry pay genuinely converged. A first year regional first officer today earns between about 90 and 105 dollars an hour against roughly 125 at a major, a ratio near 1.2 to 1.4 where it used to be close to two. Career pay did not converge at all, and the gap reopened. A twelfth year regional captain tops out somewhere between about 198 and 229 dollars an hour, against 388 to 394 at the majors, a ratio near two that widened again when the mainline scales stepped up four percent on January 1, 2026 while regional scales stayed flat.

So the regional job became a far better entry job and remained a much worse career. Which is precisely what the flow through agreements are designed to formalize. Endeavor's Career Advancement Program, which is public contract text rather than a brochure, commits Delta to taking the lesser of twenty pilots per month or fifty percent of all pilot positions Delta offers that month, waives Delta's four year degree requirement, requires no interview and no simulator evaluation, and returns a pilot to Endeavor with prior seniority intact if they fail Delta training. Envoy, PSA, and Piedmont carry similar guarantees to American, with the notable term that a pilot not offered a mainline seat by the end of year five moves to top of scale captain pay in the meantime.

Two footnotes with real teeth. Republic, which is not owned by a mainline, offers guaranteed interview pathways rather than a contractual flow, which is a materially weaker thing wearing similar language. And SkyWest's pilots have no certified union at all. They are represented by the SkyWest Airlines Pilot Association, an in house body that a federal court found in 2007 was funded one hundred percent by SkyWest, collected no dues, and had never been certified by the National Mediation Board. SkyWest's own annual report states plainly that none of its employees are represented by an outside union, and names the risk it is managing: that an outside union might limit its ability to move wages at its own pace. An ALPA organizing campaign is live as of 2026 and, by its own public tracker, has not yet reached the card collection stage.

There is one more thing worth noticing. Colgan Air was bought by Pinnacle Airlines in 2007, and Pinnacle was renamed Endeavor Air in 2013. The regional now advertising the industry's highest first year pay is the corporate descendant of the carrier whose crash produced the rule that constrained the pilot supply in the first place.

Why pilots almost never strike

Airlines and railroads are not governed by the National Labor Relations Act. They fall under the Railway Labor Act of 1926, and the difference is enormous.

Under the Railway Labor Act a contract never expires. It becomes amendable. Until a new agreement is reached, the old one stays in force and the parties remain bound by it. Either side serves a Section 6 notice to open negotiations. If direct bargaining stalls, the National Mediation Board may take the case, and the Board decides when, or whether, to release the parties. Only after the Board proffers arbitration and one side declines does a thirty day cooling off period begin, and only after that may either side resort to self help, meaning a strike or a lockout. The President may interrupt the whole thing by appointing an emergency board.

The consequence is that a strike vote is not a countdown. It is a message. Two live examples show what that feels like from inside.

Frontier's pilots opened Section 6 negotiations on July 25, 2023, and their contract became amendable in January 2024. The union filed for mediation that same month. In October 2024 the pilots voted to authorize a strike with 97 percent participation and 99 percent in favor. As of Frontier's most recent quarterly filing in May 2026, the parties were still in mediation and still bound by the existing agreement. The Board has never released them. That is roughly three years of bargaining, about two and a half of them in mediation, with a 99 percent strike mandate that has no legal effect.

Allegiant's pilots, represented by the Teamsters, jointly requested mediation in January 2023, voted 97.4 percent to authorize a strike in November 2024, and formally asked the Board for release in April 2025. The Board did not grant it. They reached a tentative agreement around July 10, 2026, and the ratification vote was still open as this was written.

FedEx shows the chokepoint most clearly of all, because the union asked to be let out and was told no. ALPA formally requested a release from mediation on March 8, 2024. The Board denied the proffer the following month. There was no appeal, no deadline, and no consequence. FedEx pilots then spent another twenty six months under pay rates negotiated in 2015 before ratifying in June 2026. The Board's discretion, not the bargaining, set the timetable.

Atlas Air shows a stranger outcome. Its pilots and the company had agreed in advance, in their merger clauses, to send unresolved joint contract issues to binding interest arbitration. The Railway Labor Act does not require that, and the National Mediation Board says so directly, but parties may agree to it. When the Teamsters tried to have the dispute treated as a major one, which would eventually have produced strike leverage, the federal courts held it was a minor dispute subject to mandatory arbitration instead. The practical effect was that self help was never available at any point. An arbitrator wrote the contract in September 2021. Atlas pilots have now worked under arbitrated terms twice running.

The numbers confirm how unusual an actual work stoppage is. The National Mediation Board reports that 97 percent of all mediation cases in its history were resolved without interruption to service, and nearly 99 percent since 1980. Emergency boards under Section 10, which cover railroads and airlines together, were created zero times in fiscal 2024 and zero times in fiscal 2025. The last emergency board involving airline pilots was in February 1997, at American. The last strike by pilots at a US airline was at Spirit in June 2010, and it lasted five days.

A 99 percent strike vote that produces nothing for two years is not a sign of a weak union. It is a sign of a statute designed to make interrupting interstate transportation nearly impossible, which is exactly what Congress intended in 1926.

The other side of the ledger

It would be dishonest to present all of this as a straightforward win, so here is the column that cuts the other way.

A contract is only worth the solvency of the company that signed it. Spirit Airlines filed for bankruptcy protection twice, in November 2024 and again in August 2025, and on May 2, 2026 it began an orderly wind down of operations. Its own filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission two days later states that the company would immediately cease filing periodic reports. Whatever those pilots had negotiated stopped mattering on a Saturday morning.

The escalators can simply run out. JetBlue's rates have been flat since August 2024. Frontier's pilots are working today under an agreement that became amendable in January 2024.

And the money can be held hostage to a vote. Allegiant has been accruing a pilot retention bonus since May 2023, and its own balance sheet showed roughly 256 million dollars accrued by March 31, 2026, payable only after ratification of a new agreement. That is a very large sum of money whose release depends on a ballot, which is leverage pointing in both directions at once.

There is also the cost column that no pay table shows. The Federal Aviation Administration requires 1,500 hours for an airline transport pilot certificate, which is a long and largely self funded apprenticeship. Seniority does not travel, so leaving is expensive in a way a salaried job's is not. Retirement is mandatory at 65 by federal rule regardless of health or desire. And the entire career rests on a medical certificate that can be revoked, which is why American's 2023 agreement added up to 5,000 dollars per procedure and 10,000 dollars lifetime for treatment needed to regain a first class medical.

What a salaried reader should take from this

You are probably not going to negotiate a duty rig. The transferable lessons are structural.

Get paid for time, not just for output. The rigs exist because pilots recognized that an employer with control over your calendar will consume it for free unless the consumption has a price. The salaried equivalent is noticing which of your hours are billed to nobody.

Prefer an index to a number. Delta's per diem beats United's because one is tied to a government cost measure and the other to a fixed 2.5 percent. The same logic separates a cost of living adjustment from a merit raise, which is the argument of the companion piece on indexed pay.

Look at the whole compensation stack, not the salary line. An 18 percent non elective retirement contribution, profit sharing on a published formula, and a guaranteed monthly floor are worth more than a headline hourly rate, and they are the parts a candidate is least likely to ask about.

And understand that the protection is the scope clause. The pay rate is what you earn; the scope clause is whether the job exists. Most workers have a wage conversation and never have the second one, because in a non union workplace there is nobody on the other side of the table to have it with. Where you cannot negotiate that protection, the remaining move is the one the rest of this series keeps arriving at, which is to convert some of the wage into assets that pay you without an employer's permission. That is the argument of the toll economy piece.

The pilots did not get 34 percent because flying is hard. They got it because several thousand people held a legal monopoly on a licensed skill, sat inside a statute that made their employer's alternatives very limited, and then wrote down every hour they wanted counted. The percentage was the outcome. The document was the method.

Related reading

• The raise written into the contract: the wider set of workers whose raise is a document rather than a decision.
• COLA versus the merit raise: why an indexed raise pulls away from a discretionary one.
• When the bills rise faster than the raise: the practical playbook for the costs that outrun a wage.
• The W-2 trap and the toll economy: owning the tolls instead of only paying them.

Fact-check notes and sources

Contract provisions are cited to contract text wherever possible, and labeled where a figure comes from a union press release or a third party aggregator instead. Two situations were unresolved as of July 19, 2026 and are flagged in the text.

• American Airlines rates, rigs, guarantees, per diem, retirement, profit sharing, scope, and duration are taken from the ratified 2023 Tentative Agreement V2.0 markup, 460 pages, published by the Allied Pilots Association and recovered through the Internet Archive because APA's negotiations subdomain no longer resolves. APA's own cover page warns the markup may contain scrivener's errors correctable after ratification, and the final signed agreement is behind member login. Note that a good deal of aviation coverage still circulates superseded figures from the earlier July 2023 version, including an international override of 6.50 and 4.50 dollars when the ratified figures are 7.00 and 5.00, and a per diem of 3.35 when the ratified figure is 3.40.
• American's ratification (72.7 percent in favor on more than 95 percent turnout, roughly 9.6 billion dollars in added value, an immediate raise above 21 percent, total compensation up more than 46 percent, amendable August 1, 2027): Allied Pilots Association, a union press release. American's audited figures for the same event are a one time payment of 754 million dollars plus 235 million in other benefit related adjustments, per its FY2023 annual report.
• Delta rates, rigs, guarantees, per diem formula, the Section 3 B.5 me too clause, retirement, profit sharing, and scope: the 2023 Pilot Working Agreement, together with the Delta MEC's Contract Comparison, September 2025 and Contract History, July 2025. The me too outcome, that United triggered a two percent increase and American did not, is stated in the Contract History and is confirmed arithmetically against the contract's own tables.
• United rates, the seventy hour floor, per diem schedule, retirement ladder, profit sharing language, scope, and the cross reference to the Delta agreement: the 2023 United Pilot Agreement. United's ratification percentage, its roughly 10 billion dollar value, and the widely quoted 40.2 percent cumulative figure could not be verified from primary text, because alpa.org is unreachable by every method attempted, including two independent proxies and the Internet Archive. Treat those three numbers as press sourced.
• Cross carrier narrowbody rates for Southwest, Alaska, and JetBlue, and the January 2027 step for American and United, come from the ALPA Contract Comparison cited above and from AirlinePilotCentral, a third party aggregator, not from signed contract text. The two sources agree to the cent where they overlap, which is the reason for including them, but first year first officer rates are single sourced and should be treated as indicative.
• Delta profit sharing expense (1,383 million, 1,389 million, and 1,337 million dollars for 2023 through 2025) and American's accruals (261 million, 228 million, and 55 million): the companies' annual reports at Delta and American.
• Frontier's status (Section 6 opened July 25, 2023; amendable January 2024; mediation filed January 2024; still in mediation and still bound by the existing agreement as of the first quarter of 2026; company retirement contribution of 12 to 15 percent replacing the match; no profit sharing): Frontier's FY2025 annual report and Q1 2026 quarterly report. The October 2024 strike authorization of 99 percent in favor on 97 percent participation is from the Frontier MEC, a union source.
• Allegiant's status (joint mediation request January 2023; 97.4 percent strike authorization November 2024; release requested April 2025 and not granted; tentative agreement announced around July 10, 2026 and not yet ratified as of publication): Allegiant's FY2025 annual report and Q1 2026 quarterly report, which also carry the retention bonus accrual of 255,984 thousand dollars at March 31, 2026 and the fact that it is payable only after ratification. The proposed rates and the 15 percent retirement contribution are from the Local 2118 tentative agreement summary, a union document whose own disclaimer notes the contract text controls. Because the vote was open at publication, no ratification percentage is asserted.
• Spirit's wind down (operations wind down begun May 2, 2026, and immediate cessation of periodic reporting): Spirit's own Form 8-K filed May 4, 2026. The bankruptcy filings of November 2024 and August 2025 are in the same company's filing history.
• The Railway Labor Act process (contracts become amendable rather than expiring, Section 6 notices, National Mediation Board mediation, proffer of arbitration, the thirty day cooling off period, and presidential emergency boards): National Mediation Board. The 97 percent and 99 percent resolution rates, the zero Section 10 emergency boards in fiscal 2024 and 2025, and the statement that Railway Labor Act contracts do not expire are from the Board's FY2025 annual report and its mediation overview. The last airline pilot emergency board is Presidential Emergency Board 233, created by Executive Order 13036 on February 15, 1997, per the Board's roster of emergency boards.
• FedEx (the July 2023 rejection at 57 to 43 on 5,119 of 5,172 ballots; ratification June 9, 2026 at 83 percent on 98.5 percent turnout; effective June 29, 2026; the 39.76 percent increase and subsequent three percent steps; the widebody captain rate of 469.00 dollars; the amendable period recovery payments of 150,000 and 102,500 dollars against the rejected offer of 30,450 and 19,950; and the closure of the defined benefit plan to new hires): the FedEx pilots' own ratification documents, including the Section 3 redline book, the Section 28 retirement summary, and the signed ballot certification. ALPA's March 8, 2024 request for release and the Board's denial are documented in FedEx's own negotiations timeline.
• UPS (roughly 3,400 pilots, amendable September 1, 2025, and the non union accrual freeze that did not reach pilots): the FY2025 annual report. The pension formula, one percent of final average earnings times years of service capped at thirty years, or the greater flat dollar alternative, is in the plan document filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The single scale across all aircraft types is contract text, Article 12.A.2. The top of scale rate of 401.01 dollars and the twelve percent money purchase contribution are from AirlinePilotCentral, an aggregator, and the current flat dollar pension amounts could not be verified from a primary source.
• Atlas Air (the binding interest arbitration agreed in the merger clauses, the courts treating the dispute as minor and therefore not strikeable, and the September 10, 2021 award): the signed joint agreement and the Second Circuit's opinion in Atlas Air, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, No. 18-1086-cv. That interest arbitration is permitted but not required under the statute is stated in the Board's FY2025 annual report cited above.
• The 1,500 hour rule and its origin (Colgan Air flight 3407 on February 12, 2009, with 49 aboard and one person on the ground killed): NTSB accident report AAR-10/01. The statute is Public Law 111-216, section 217(c)(1). The implementing rule is at 78 FR 42324; the reduced thresholds are at 14 CFR 61.160 and the separate 1,000 hour requirement to serve as a Part 121 captain is at 14 CFR 121.436.
• The 2022 regional pay increases: Piedmont, Envoy, and Republic, all company or union announcements. SkyWest's increases, and the crucial detail that it amended its capacity purchase agreements with its major partners to fund them, are in its FY2022 annual report. Note that the widely repeated "50 percent raise" at Envoy and PSA describes a temporary premium layered on the base scale, not a change to the scale itself, and Envoy's is currently stated to run through December 31, 2026.
• Regional first officer pay over time (about 45 dollars in 2017, 52 in 2021, 91 in 2023, and 93 in 2024): Government Accountability Office. Current regional rates are from carrier career pages and are company sourced.
• Flow through agreements: Endeavor's is public contract text, Letter of Agreement 129. The American subsidiaries' terms are from company announcements rather than contract text.
• SkyWest representation (the association's funding, absence of dues, and lack of certification by the National Mediation Board): findings of fact in SkyWest Pilots ALPA Organizing Committee v. SkyWest Airlines, No. C-07-2688 CRB, decided in 2007, together with SkyWest's own FY2025 annual report. Those court findings describe the association as it stood in 2007 and may not describe it today.
• The gross pay tables are my own arithmetic, not figures published by any airline. Each is the cited hourly rate multiplied by either the contractual monthly guarantee or by 85 credit hours, then by twelve; the weekly column is the annual figure divided by 52. Guarantees used are the ones cited above: 65 credit hours for Delta and United lineholders, 70 at Allegiant, 72 at the cargo integrators, and 75 at the regionals. They exclude per diem, profit sharing, retirement contributions, international and premium overrides, and any reduction for time spent in initial training, so treat them as the shape of the pay rather than anyone's actual W-2.
• The retirement comparison uses the 18 percent non elective contribution cited above for Delta and United in 2026 against an illustrative private sector design of a 50 percent match on the first 6 percent of pay. That match design is a common one, not a measured national average, and it is used here to show the structural difference rather than to make a statistical claim. The 2026 elective deferral limit of 24,500 dollars is the federal figure. The compounding illustration applies 7 percent annually to the difference alone and is arithmetic, not a forecast.
• The cost of training: tuition of 123,995 dollars from zero time, 100,995 with credit for solo, and 90,995 with a private pilot certificate, plus roughly 12,000 dollars in examiner and knowledge test fees, about 12,000 in apps and gear, and up to 5,000 in training center premiums, are all published by ATP Flight School. One large academy's list price is not an industry average, and costs vary widely by pathway, including military and collegiate routes that change the economics entirely. ATP's page does not state the total flight hours its program provides.
• Headline raise percentages cited in the opening (Delta 34 percent, United up to about 40, American 21 and 46, Southwest roughly 50 compounded) are press and union summaries rather than contract text, and are examined rather than accepted in the body of this piece. Sources are collected in the companion post.
• Atlas Air contract terms (the 4.95 trip rig and the absence of any duty rig, the 64 hour minimum monthly guarantee and 74 for instructors, deadhead credited one for two, 14 days off in a 31 day bid month and 13 in a 30 day month, a ceiling of 17 consecutive duty days before four consecutive days off, voluntary out base assignments capped at seven percent of a fleet type against a 130 hour guarantee with no scheduled days off, company paid gateway travel from one of 190 designated airports within 130 miles of a pilot's residence, a 401(k) of two percent non elective plus a dollar for dollar match on the first ten percent of gross pay, profit sharing at ten percent of pre tax profits after those profits are reduced by 50 million dollars, per diem of 2.75 and 3.50 dollars rising ten cents each January 1 up to and including January 1, 2026, the Article 32 maximum takeoff weight bands, and the September 10, 2021 effective and September 10, 2026 amendable dates): the signed 2021 agreement published by Teamsters Local 2750. The year 2026 appears exactly twice in the document, on the cover page and in the per diem article.
• The fifteen day comparison and the 46 percent figure are my own arithmetic, not a published statistic. It runs 360 hours away from base through each carrier's trip rig and applies a top of scale rate to the result: a year twelve Atlas 747 captain at 332.68 dollars on the September 1, 2025 table against a year fifteen FedEx widebody captain at 469.00 dollars under the 2026 agreement. On rates alone the gap is 29 percent, the rig cuts a further 24 percent off what is left, and the two compound to about 46. It describes those two seats on that trip and not the ACMI tier, where Kalitta and ABX Air have no trip rig at all and Air Transport International's is 1 for 6.4. FedEx's 1 for 3.75 trip rig is ALPA's September 2023 figure and predates the agreement FedEx pilots ratified in June 2026, so treat the pairing as indicative rather than as a matched set.
• Cross carrier cargo rigs, minimum guarantees, deadhead treatment, scheduled increases, and retirement plan types: ALPA's Contract Comparison, a September 2023 synopsis prepared by its Economic and Financial Analysis team and distributed by the Air Transport International negotiating committee. It is a union summary rather than contract text and its own introduction says it abridges and paraphrases. It is the source for the trip rig table, for an A Plan appearing at only FedEx and UPS among the ten carriers surveyed, for Kalitta's twelve percent company contribution with no pilot contribution required, for ABX Air paying deadhead at 100 percent on company aircraft, and for the note that Kalitta was entering Section 6 a year early with 2.5 percent annual increases through 2024. ALPA's own May 2026 release puts that opener at eighteen months early instead, so the two union documents do not agree with each other.
• Atlas Air Worldwide's last public financials (the ACMI and CMI service definitions, salaries wages and benefits of 1,135.2 million dollars against 4,549.1 million of operating revenue, the 22.8 percent increase attributed primarily to pilot costs under the new agreement, 328,050 block hours, approximately 2,700 pilots out of roughly 4,500 employees, and the company's own statement that all of its pilots were receiving significantly higher pay, quality of life improvements and enhanced benefits): the FY2022 annual report, the last one the company filed. The block hours per pilot figure is my arithmetic on those two numbers and assumes a four person crew on every departure, which makes it a ceiling rather than an average.
• Air Transport Services Group (Amazon at 33 percent of 2024 revenue, the Department of Defense at 29 and DHL at 14; ACMI Services pre tax earnings of 0.7 million dollars in 2024 against 32.0 million in 2023 across 97 in service aircraft; approximately 1,120 flight crewmembers; every defined benefit plan frozen during 2009 with 2.64 years of average remaining service estimated for crewmembers; and contract amendable dates of March 21, 2021 for Air Transport International's pilots and January 2, 2030 for ABX Air's): the FY2024 annual report. The sentence about flight crew cost varying with collective bargaining agreements is in the competition discussion rather than the risk factors. The statement that roughly twenty percent of employees are under amendable agreements and that the parties jointly sought mediation covers four bargaining units across two of its airlines, not the Air Transport International pilots alone.
• Both ACMI parents leaving public disclosure (Atlas Air Worldwide at 102.50 dollars a share on March 17, 2023 to Rand Parent, LLC, affiliated with funds managed by affiliates of Apollo Global Management, J.F. Lehman & Company and Hill City Capital, financed in part with 850 million dollars of 8.500 percent senior secured notes due 2030 guaranteed by the holding company and certain subsidiaries on a first priority basis; Air Transport Services Group at 22.50 dollars a share on April 11, 2025 to Stonepeak): the closing reports on Form 8-K at Atlas and Air Transport Services Group. Both filed a Form 15 within two weeks of closing, Atlas on March 28, 2023 and Air Transport Services Group on April 21, 2025.
• What Teamsters Local 2750 publishes (more than 2,800 Atlas pilots, a seven member executive board, a public post archive of 68 items whose most recent negotiations entry is titled Final JCBA Proposals Submitted and carries a byline of February 16, 2021, a News Wire running to Issue 253 dated April 24, 2026 with every issue behind a member login, a six member negotiating committee chaired by Doug Malcolm of whom three also sit on the executive board, and the pilot resignation counter): the local's public site. The counter is restamped as the number moves, so the figures in this piece are the reading on the day it was written and will not match a later visit.
• The Atlas Section 6 position (Atlas appearing with the Teamsters only as a training entry in the alternative dispute resolution table, and in no docketed or closed mediation case): the Board's FY2025 annual report. A Section 6 notice is exchanged between the parties and is not filed with any agency, so its absence from the public record settles nothing in either direction. The precedent that the notice arrives at the amendable date rather than months ahead of it is the Teamsters' own announcement, published February 24, 2016, that it had served notices on Atlas Air and Southern Air on February 16. The Teamsters national newsroom has carried nothing on the Atlas pilots' bargaining since its October 1, 2019 announcement that Local 2750 had formed, although the local does appear in later member services items.
• Atlas Air Worldwide's 2026 public communications (seven press releases, none mentioning pilots, the Teamsters, labor or negotiations, covering the March 16, 2026 order for 20 Airbus A350F freighters with options for 20 more and deliveries from 2029 through 2034, an investment in Air Atlanta announced May 28 and completed August 3, a sustainability report, an aircraft sale, an aircraft acquisition, and the April 27 appointment of a chief people officer): the company newsroom. Because the company no longer files with the Securities and Exchange Commission there is no risk factor or labor note to read alongside them.
• The comparison cases inside the tier: Air Transport International's ALPA council home page carries a contract ratified banner and a June 25, 2026 update saying that with the completion of contract negotiations the council could finally schedule grievance mediation with the National Mediation Board. The banner names a Tuesday, March 30, and March 30, 2026 was a Monday, so no ratification date is asserted here, and the rates, duration and amendable date sit behind a member login. Kalitta's grant of 2 million dollars from ALPA's Major Contingency Fund is ALPA's own announcement, which alpa.org would not serve to me, so the terms here come from a verbatim reprint dated May 11, 2026. Kalitta's pilots are ALPA rather than Teamsters because the representation changed in February 2018, after the 2016 round ended in impasse.

This post is informational and journalistic, not career, legal, or financial advice. It describes published collective bargaining agreements, union documents, and public securities filings. Contract terms escalate on scheduled dates and two of the situations described were unresolved as of July 19, 2026, so verify current status before relying on any figure. Mentions of specific airlines and unions are nominative fair use, and no affiliation is implied.