# Stolen-Login Response Kit for Small Businesses on Rented Cloud This kit helps a small business respond when a hosting or cloud provider says attackers used stolen credentials to reach customer secrets, as Rackspace reported on its Spot platform. It's built to be printed and used alone: inventory who has access, rotate secrets in order of risk, check for workloads nobody launched, confirm patch status on the five newly exploited products, and keep a one-page runbook for next time. Hand sections to your IT contractor or work through them yourself. Nothing here needs special software. ## Checklist - [ ] Get a written list of every person and service account with admin access to cloud, hosting and Kubernetes (use Worksheet 1). - [ ] Ask your developer or host whether you run anything on Rackspace Spot or on Kubernetes, and get the answer in writing. - [ ] Inventory every secret your apps use (API keys, database passwords, tokens) and where each lives. - [ ] Rotate all secrets if you were on Rackspace Spot; otherwise rotate payment and database credentials as a precaution (Worksheet 2). - [ ] Log each rotation: secret, where used, who rotated, date, verified. - [ ] Review the last 30 days of cloud billing for spikes and unfamiliar line items. - [ ] List running workloads, containers and servers and flag any nobody on your team launched. - [ ] Turn on multi-factor authentication for every cloud, hosting and admin account. - [ ] Remove accounts for departed staff and finished contractors. - [ ] Move secrets out of plain config files into a secrets manager; give each app its own least-privilege key. - [ ] Confirm patch status and internet exposure for vCenter, NetWeaver, Expressway, Roller and LiteLLM (Worksheet 3). - [ ] Rotate provider keys stored in any AI gateway and set spending caps with each provider. - [ ] Fill in the incident runbook (Section 5) and check your cyber insurance notice deadline. - [ ] Watch for Rackspace's follow-up on which customers and secrets were affected. ## Worksheet 1: Who has access to what | System (cloud, host, Kubernetes, admin tool) | Person or service account | Role / permissions | MFA on? (Y/N) | Still needed? (Y/N) | Date reviewed | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ## Worksheet 2: Secrets rotation log Rotate in this order: payment keys, database passwords, cloud and admin tokens, email and messaging tokens, everything else. | Risk order | Secret (name only, never the value) | Where used | Rotated by | Date | Verified app still works (Y/N) | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | 1 | | | | | | | 2 | | | | | | | 3 | | | | | | | 4 | | | | | | ## Worksheet 3: Patch and exposure tracker Federal fix-by date for the first four was November 23. LiteLLM was in the November 20 batch of five. | Product | In use? (Y/N) | Version | Owner | Date patched | Admin interface reachable from internet? (Y/N) | |---|---|---|---|---|---| | VMware vCenter | | | | | | | SAP NetWeaver | | | | | | | Cisco Expressway | | | | | | | Apache Roller | | | | | | | BerriAI LiteLLM | | | | | | ## Section 4: 30-minute unauthorized-activity review 1. Open billing for the last 30 days. Note any line item or total that jumped. Write the dates here: ________ 2. List running compute, containers and servers. Circle any with odd names, unusual regions, or no known owner. 3. List user accounts and API keys created in the last 90 days. Circle any nobody can explain. 4. Check access logs or sign-in history for logins from unfamiliar locations or at odd hours. 5. Record findings as clear, suspicious, or can't tell, and send the suspicious ones to your admin the same day. ## Section 5: One-page incident runbook, "A login was stolen" - First call (name, phone): ______________________ - Second call (name, phone): ______________________ - Person who decides on customer notification: ______________________ - First hour: disable the stolen account, rotate the secrets it could read (Worksheet 2 order), turn on MFA everywhere. - Preserve: screenshots of billing and resource lists, exported logs, the date and time you noticed. Do not delete suspicious workloads before you've recorded them. - Insurer: policy number ____________, notice deadline in days ____ (look it up; do not guess), phone ____________. - Customers: notify if their data or credentials could have been read; check your state's breach-notification rules. ## Template: email to your host or contractor ```text Subject: Were we affected by the Rackspace Spot credential breach? Hi [name], Rackspace has said attackers used compromised credentials to read Kubernetes secrets in customer clusters on its Spot platform. Please reply in writing by [date] with: 1. Do we run anything on Rackspace Spot or on Kubernetes? If so, which services? 2. A list of every person and service account with admin access. 3. Which secrets (API keys, database passwords, tokens) are stored in those clusters. 4. Whether you have rotated them, and if not, when you will. 5. Whether you found any workloads or billing activity we did not authorize. 6. Patch status and internet exposure for VMware vCenter, SAP NetWeaver, Cisco Expressway, Apache Roller and LiteLLM, if we use any of them. If you can't answer something, tell me what you'd need to find out. Thanks, [your name] ``` ## Template: AI-assistant prompt for the rotation plan ```text A hosting provider says attackers accessed customer Kubernetes secrets. I'm pasting below an inventory of the secrets our web app uses and where each is used. Build a step-by-step rotation plan ordered by risk, include how to avoid downtime, and give me a log with columns: secret, where used, rotated by, date, verified. Work only from my inventory. If something looks missing or you are unsure how a service handles rotation, say so and tell me what to check in that vendor's documentation. [paste inventory] ``` ## Template: AI-assistant prompt for the KEV question ```text CISA added VMware vCenter, SAP NetWeaver, Cisco Expressway and Apache Roller to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities list. I'm pasting our IT asset list below. Tell me which of these products appear in it, then write a short message to my IT provider asking which versions we run, whether management interfaces are reachable from the internet, and when each will be patched. If the list doesn't name versions, say so. [paste asset list] ``` ## Sources - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/rackspace-spot-breach-let-hackers-access-customer-kubernetes-secrets/ - https://apprised.news/desk/tech/2026-11-22 - https://apprised.news/desk/tech/2026-11-21 - https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/bell-canada-says-agentic-hacker-stole-enterprise-customer-data/ - https://www.wired.com/story/brace-yourself-for-years-of-outage-chaos/